5. THE LAW OF MARKEDNESS

Having established an understanding of typological logic, we can now take that understanding as our point of view, and the principles of typological logic as our frame of reference. From that position of logical advantage, we will turn our attention to a direct examination of the phenomena of markedness in natural language and the conventional linguistic point of view in terms of which those phenomena have been perceived, investigated, and conceptualized as an unorganized collection of isolated formal asymmetries of an arbitrary and unexplainable nature. From the typological point of view we will see that the conventional point of view of linguistics induces a distorted, fragmented, and severely restricted apprehension of the phenomena of markedness. And, from the typological point of view we will see that these seemingly scattered and arbitrary asymmetries are actually the substance of the very fabric of language and that they can be re-cognized and explained as a coherent and systematic function of a single underlying principle, the Law of Marks.

In this section, Section 4.1, we will state the Law of Marks and briefly discuss its formulation. Then, we will take one specific law of markedness as an example, one that is formally simple, well-known, and well established, to examine in detail. The purpose of this examination is to introduce the basic idea of markedness, to investigate the conventional linguistic point of view in terms of the way this example has been conceptualized from that point of view, and to clarify the logical and empirical standing of this specific law of markedness, and by implication, of all of the many specific laws that have been formulated and evaluated.

In Section 4.2, we will examine the word "mark". It is obviously critical to an understanding of the Law of Marks and how that law works. I do not intend the word "mark" to be taken in any special or unique technical sense, but rather in exactly the sense that it is used in ordinary English. But, since the Law of Marks is a very simple but primitive law of wide scope, and since this particular word, like all other words, is shrouded in the usual veil of ambiguity, vagueness, and confusion, and subject to the same vicissitudes as all other words, it is crucial to dig its underlying sense out from under the surface of confusion and distill it down to its essential and most primitive meaning.

In Section 4.3, we will cite a broad sampling of the corroborating empirical evidence which is already available in the literature of linguistics, primarily in the form of more or less specific universals of markedness, and we will also offer some new empirical evidence and predictions as well.

Let us approach the statement of the Law of Marks in terms of a summary statement of the logical grounding of that law in typological logic. The fundamental relation of typological logic is that of priority, in which the first type is prior to the second type is prior to the third type. The primitive relation of priority is manifest in all relations: In logic, the subsequent presupposes the prior; In time, the subsequent follows the prior; In law, the subsequent is governed by the prior; In tactics, the subsequent is dominated by the prior; In strategy, the position of the subsequent is subordinate to that of the prior; In phenomenology, the subsequent depends on the prior; and, so on.
As a function of the logical relation of priority, the type of secondness is prior to the type of thirdness. In that thirdness is the type of the symbol, it follows that language, in so far as it is symbolic, is the type of thirdness. From this, it follows that the symbolic point of view and the symbolic characteristics of language (symbolic logic, symbolic law, symbolic meaning and reference, symbolic form and structure, and symbolic function) are subsequent to the logic of secondness.

In that strategy is prior to tactics, position is prior to dynamics. Since the positional orientation of secondness is radial opposition and the positional orientation of thirdness is diametrical opposition, it follows that the symbolic point of view and that the symbolic characteristics of language are governed by the relation of diametrical opposition, and it also follows that that point of view and those characteristics are relatively superficial, being subordinate to and dominated by the prior relation of radial opposition. Therefore, we would expect to find signs of incorrect orientation and consequent confusion in the conventional symbolic point of view and we would expect to find patterns of formal structure in the surface of language which are a function of the underlying logical orientation of radial opposition and the logic of secondness.

As the elements of formal structure in language consist of marks, those marks should manifest the underlying asymmetrical orientation of radial opposition, and, for reasons which we will explain in Section 4.2, corresponding to the fact that the first is presupposed, the second must bear the mark. Thus the Law of Marks is as follows.

THE SECOND IS MARKED

Or, stated from the point of view of form,

EVERY MARK IS A SIGN OF A SECOND

Note that this is law must be formulated in the logic of secondness where the positional orientation of radial opposition governs. The law cannot be stated or understood coherently in the logic of thirdness, therefore, we must guard carefully against the explicit or implicit intrusion of the elements or principles of that logic into our thinking about this law.

This particular way of formulating the law reflects the fact that the law is a function of the logic of secondness as distinct from the logic of thirdness. It assumes that the law is a relation between no more than two elements. It assumes that the second is identifiable as the second in itself without the necessity of the presence of the first. The first need not be brought in to testify to the secondness of the second, for it is the nature of the second that in its logic and meaning it presupposes the first and in its form it bears
the marks of its secondness in itself, or, in other words, that a mark is the manifestation in form of secondness. In short, a mark is the embodiment of secondness.

If one were to try to state this law in the usual linguistic format, it might be like this:

"the first is unmarked and the second is marked."

This is perfectly adequate as a description of the superficial formal facts, and, of course, this format was developed from the point of view of form. Form in language, being of the type of thirdness, consists of law of the type of conventions. Thus taking the point of view of form in language is taking the point of view conventions, i.e., the logic of thirdness. For that reason, this formulation does not make sense and does not work right in terms of meaning at the level of thirdness nor in terms of the logic of secondness. Meaning in thirdness is organized in diametrical oppositions, so there is no direct and overt manifestation of priority. There are semantic manifestations of priority in thirdness, but they are distorted and not direct and straightforward, so in the logic of thirdness one could not distinguish which is which.

From the point of secondness it is the first clause which makes this formulation incoherent: it uses the negative, but there is no negative in the logic of secondness. The word of negation is itself a symbolic representation of the dynamic of secondness as that which struggles to differentiate itself from the unity of being. Thus, it is logically impossible to have a coherent relation between the first and the second and to have the concept of negation at the same time.

Also, we saw in Section 2 that the phenomenological type of secondness is that of the tactics of brute physical being, whereas that of thirdness is that of game-like transactions in terms of conventional game-like law. Accordingly, negation does not have brute being and brute force. It is an abstract symbolic operation of no physical substance and no material effect, the operation of information (taking this word literally). However, as marking is a function of secondness, it must be a brute physical phenomenon, an act which manipulates brute force of some kind. To mark is to do something physically, to embody intent in a tangible material act or substance. You cannot physically mark something by negating it, nor can you unmark something, unless it has been previously marked. If you negate a tree by saying, "not this tree" or "this tree is not", it has no effect on the tree. And if you write "not" on the tree, then you are not negating, but writing. If you want to mark the tree, you must physically do something to the tree, such as cut it or paint it or tie a ribbon on it, or at least remember it. As we saw in Section 3, in the analysis of the wink, the intent to wink is marked by certain acts which are extrinsic to the wink itself, such as screwing up the muscles around the eye. Of course, one need not mark intent, but then that would not have anything to do with negation either. If you do not do something, that is no more negation than doing something. Negation is simply out of place in the logic of secondness; it has no logical position to occupy and has no tangible function and no brute force.

In addition, whereas the second is necessarily a brute tangible phenomenon, the first is not necessarily tangibly apprehensible. In the logical relation between assertion and presupposition, the latter is prior, and, it is not possible to negate a presupposition. It is possible to not notice a presupposition, or to notice one, but it is logically and
grammatically impossible to negate one. It is possible, in some cases, to assert a presupposition and then to negate it, but once it is asserted, it is no longer a presupposition. Once it is asserted, it is physically apprehensible.

And in many cases, the first cannot be directly asserted or tangibly apprehended in any way at all, in which case, the first cannot even be marked physically, let alone negated. For example, silence is prior to sound. One can shout "No!" at silence, but the sound of a shout is not negation - it is a mark of intent, the intent to banish silence, and as sound it is the physical embodiment of a second. But, because silence is absolutely first, it is absolutely impossible to physically mark it as first. It is only possible for the second to be marked.

Aside from being logically incoherent and inconsequential, the first clause of that description is unnecessary. If we assume that a mark is something extrinsic that is done, then the first is not marked to begin with. And if the second is marked, then the first will remain unmarked. Thus, there is no relevant information in saying, "the first is unmarked". So, if we take out the first clause, then we are left with the formulation of the law as I have given it; the second is marked.

One might notice that some of these arguments rest on the assumption that to mark is to do something extrinsic, to add something, and one might, thinking symmetrically, suggest that it is logically possible to distinguish the first by taking something away. It is true that it is logically possible to suppose this, but only in the logic of thirdness and from the point of view which assumes that form is prior, for which reason it does not work. If the first and the second were originally the same in form, then one could formally differentiate the first by removing a piece of form. But, if we begin reasoning from form and derive difference by operating on forms, and if the forms are the same, then how could you tell which is first? Although it is possible to assume form is prior, it cannot work, and no does assume that form is prior to meaning anyway. Thus, in spite of the fact that taking the point of view of form is the predominant logical position in linguistic theory, everyone holds the contrary assumption that form serves meaning. We must consistently begin with the logic of typological priority and understand and explain the derivation of force from position, and semantics from force, and form from semantics; it is impossible to be consistent by assuming the priority of the symbolic logic of symbolic form.

Another alternative one might consider is to state the law in the active voice rather than in the passive. Instead of "the second is marked", one might consider something like one of these formulations.

You mark the second.
Someone marks the second.
The speaker marks the second.

The question that is raised when one tries to state it in the active is, who is the agent of this marking? In the logic of secondness, there are just two possibilities: either the first marks the second or the second marks itself. The first does not inflict the mark on the second, because the first does not oblige the second to become second. But, the mark is a natural and necessary physical consequence of the prior and inescapable law of the first, from which the second nevertheless seeks to escape. Its struggle to become an
independent second, its violation of the inescapable law of the first, its violent and tense thrust toward independence, all of these physically embody and tangibly manifest the boundary of its independence and identity by which the second is marked. We will return to the meaning of the word "mark" in the next section.

Now we will examine an example of markedness and the conceptualization of the phenomena of markedness in the conventional symbolic frame of reference of diametrical opposition which has dominated and confused the linguistic point of view.

It is common for linguists to characterize the linguistic point of view as one in which the inductive and empirical is prior to the deductive and theoretical. (In the case of language, the principles of logic are the fundamental theoretical principles.) Bloomfield, for example, said

The only useful generalizations about language are inductive generalizations (p. 20)

This view of the relation between the inductive-empirical and the deductive-logical is confused. It is possible to logically relate the deductive to the inductive by deducing empirical predictions. But, if one wants to get from the inductive to the deductive, one must hypothecate principles from which the empirical is deduced. Thus, deduction is integral to both modes of reasoning and is logically prior.

In the physical perception of phenomena, in selecting elements out from the continuous stream of sensory input, in evaluating them as important or trivial, in gathering, representing, and organizing them, in all of these fundamental empirical operations, before one comes to the question of how to explain them, one has already made elaborate implicit theoretical and logical assumptions. It would be impossible to take the first inductive step without doing so. It is incorrect to take the inductive as prior to the deductive, when the relation of priority is actually the reverse.

However, the intent behind the assertion of empirical priority in linguistics is correct, in that it is trying to get at the fact that linguistic fact is prior to perception. In so far as language is symbolic, it does not consist of brute facts which are perceived, but rather of laws of the phenomenological order of thirdness, which are learned. When you learn a language, what you learn is not perceptible, and when you know a language, what you know is not tangibly apprehensible, and this knowledge is not subject to the laws and vicissitudes of physical substance, yet it can and does have profound effects on perception. If one knows English, one knows that the word used to refer to a dog is "dog", and this knowledge is not subject to doubt as a function of any brute facts about dogs or the perception of dogs or any brute facts about sounds or the perception of sound. And yet, the knowledge of the word "dog" can have significant effects on the way in which one perceives dogs. In this sense, linguistic fact is epistemologically prior to perception, and therefore, any theoretical or logical or other deductive hypotheses are subject to the verification of this prior knowledge, but this knowledge is not prior to deduction, because it is apprehended by means of the interrelation of deduction and perception.
When we speak of the inductive-empirical point of view, then, it is really only a matter of putting theoretical and logical premises out of mind and focusing on small pieces of what we take as fact. Those assumptions do not cease to function as the underlying frame of reference and standard in terms of which we apprehend and manipulate facts. Thus what Bloomfield, and linguists in general, are talking about here is not exactly the inductive empirical point of view, as if there were one and only one such point of view, but rather the inductive empirical point of view which is established on the premise that symbolic logic, and the level of thirdness in general, is the one and only point of view. This has been the predominate and nearly universally assumed point of view in the study of language. And, of course, it is the one that is in dispute here.

In analyzing the superficial form of language from that point of view, linguists have discovered many different and seemingly unconnected instances of a pattern of asymmetrical relations between opposites in the structure and function of language. One of the simplest and clearest and most well established examples is the relation in nouns between the singular and plural. As we saw in Section 3, this is a formal manifestation of the primitive quantitative concept of "many" and that it is second to the unitary qualitative concept of "one", so it obviously follows from the Law of Marks that the plural is marked.30

From the point of view of thirdness, using the concept of the mark, this relation has been stated like this:

The singular is unmarked and the plural is marked.31

To illustrate in English, the singular form of "house" is "houses". The formal asymmetry in these words is that the plural has an additional piece of structure, the suffix -s, which constitutes the mark. Of course, not all languages mark the plural in the same way. One can describe the particular law of English informally like this (morphological variation aside):

Add {-s} to plural nouns.

There are many other types of asymmetry, and often they are very complex, but we can examine the general conceptual status the principles of markedness in terms of this simple example.

From the point of view of symbolic logic, one would expect it to be as likely for the reverse asymmetry to be found:

the singular is marked and the plural is unmarked.

30 The logical position of the third element, the dual category, was discussed in Section 3. I will ignore it here as it introduces a great deal of expository complexity, but does not materially effect the force of the argument.

31 This use of the concept of the mark in linguistics was in the Prague School, most notably in the work of Trubetzkoy, and imported to America by Roman Jakobson, who has been its most persistent and prolific advocate. I believe it is safe to say that it is generally accepted among linguists now, though it is relatively little used.
Using English forms to illustrate, one would expect to find languages with surface forms like "houses" as the singular and "house" as the plural, which would be described by a language particular law:

add {-s} to singular nouns.

But there is no language which fulfills this symmetrical expectation.

The absence of such a language could be taken to be an accident of sampling, though it cannot be dismissed as insignificant, since there are hundreds of languages and varieties of language in evidence. And, the kind of fact needed would be easy to find, if it were there. If one were inclined to value statistical evidence, this would have to be considered to be statistically significant in the technical sense, though it is unfortunately the nature of statistical argument that it still could not be concluded that the absence of such a language is not an accident.

However, the inadequacy of statistical argument need not concern us because this is far from being the only kind of evidence. The most persuasive kinds of evidence, for linguists at least, is seen in much more complex systems of marking where independent intersecting patterns of asymmetry are intricately structured so as to preserve asymmetry throughout, and can be seen to adjust in language change, in history, in child development, and in pathology, in such a way as to preserve asymmetry of every independent relation as the whole system changes through development or collapse. Due to the complexity of such arguments, we will not consider them here. Probably the most compelling evidence as judged from the hard science point of view is the consistent higher frequency of the unmarked form in comparison to its marked counterpart. In our present example, singular nouns have been found to be much more frequent in counting studies of various kinds of texts in many different languages. Thus there is an abundance of both soft and hard evidence that the laws of markedness, and this example in particular, are valid across all languages. In keeping with their universal validity such specific principles of markedness are called "universals of language."^32

The logical problem in the conceptualization of the phenomena of markedness is the confusion which is engendered by the implicit assumption of the priority of the logic of thirdness. The most fundamental manifestation of this confusion within linguistics, as well as between linguistics and other disciplines, is in regard to the logical and theoretical status of such "universals of language", which confusion we will now examine and try to sort out.

The confusion is the result of the dilemma of being compelled, on one hand, by the inconvenient force of empirical evidence to posit the universality of profound and pervasive asymmetry in the structure of language and, on the other hand, constrained from doing so by an assumed theoretical position which holds that the fundamental structure of language is the symmetrical relation of diametrical opposition. This conflict and resulting confusion is palpable in all discussions of markedness in linguistics. In Section 3, we saw evidence of this confusion in the work of Jakobson. It is also evident throughout the two classic works in which Greenberg (1966a, a collection of essays from

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^32 See Greenberg, 1966, for a discussion of the universal validity of universals in general and of this law in particular. See p. 31-34 for statistical evidence of frequency of occurrence from various languages.
a 1961 conference, and 1966b) first drew together these scattered observations under the heading of "language universals".

As an example of this confusion, we will examine the text of the latter of these seminal works. I should perhaps emphasize once again that the observation of such self-contradictory confusion is not to be taken as criticism, but rather as a sign of the struggle to deal with this conflict between empirical force and logical restraint. Greenberg's work is, like Jakobson's, a significant contribution to the effort to deal with this conflict.

Greenberg writes about the ubiquity of this asymmetry in language, thus.

*The pervasive nature in human thinking of this tendency to take one of the members of an oppositional category as unmarked...can be shown to operate even within the austere confines of mathematical and logical symbolism. Thus negative is always taken as the marked member of the positive-negative opposition; -5 is always negative, but 5 itself is either the absolute value of 5, that is 5 abstracted from its sign value or +5 as the opposite of the marked negative category. So, in logic p was used ambiguously either as the proposition p abstracted from its truth value as either true or false, or, on the other hand, for the assertion of the truth of p. Note that logicians use the term 'truth value', involving the unmarked member, not 'falsity value' to express the over-all category which has truth and falsity as members...*(1966b, p. 25)

In saying that people "take one category as unmarked", when he could have said, and in some places did say, "one category is unmarked", he implies that the category is not really unmarked. He implies that human beings are following their own random and mysterious proclivities in doing so, contrary to what he assumes the real nature of these categories to be, namely symmetrically opposing categories of equal standing, one not significantly different from the other. He is assuming that the choice of this one or that one is an arbitrary matter, an unexplainable quirk of human nature. And yet all people in all languages in their perversity always seem to choose the same one of the two oppositional categories.

Of course, at the same time, it would not really make sense to speak of a category as being marked, since a mark is an element of form, but a category is not. In other words, he cannot say that such and such a category is first or second, because his logical premises prevent him from conceptualizing a relation of priority between categories. In this way, the assumption of the priority of form and of formal logic leads to conceptual entanglement of the very language used in trying to talk about the underlying asymmetry of concepts.

Note that where he speaks of this mysterious human perversity operating "even within the austere confines of mathematical and logical symbolism", he is presupposing an opposition between human thinking, on one hand, and that of mathematicians and logicians, on the other, by which he gives evidence that he recognizes that there is a conflict between the two. And he asserts by the "even" that he would not have expected "human thinking" to have contaminated those "austere confines", but it does, nevertheless, and with an illogical aplomb that has remained unnoticed, no doubt because it is an unwelcome, ill-mannered, and indigestible, beastly intrusion of the logic of secondness into the logic of those austere confines.

He observes the pattern of this perversity in other categories:
Where a heterogeneous collection is to be named, that is one which has members of two or more categories, one of them is often regularly chosen as the representative in the plural...The Arab grammarians call this *taghli:b* or 'dominance'... *?abawa:nî* literally 'the fathers (dual)' with the meaning 'father and mother', where once more the unmarked masculine functions as a surrogate for the gender category...also such usages as Spanish *los padres* for 'parents' lit. 'the fathers'; *los hijos* 'the children' lit. 'the sons'. (p.30-31)

What he means by a "heterogeneous collection" is not really heterogeneous, but rather a system of two or three (never more than three) categories in opposition, according to the pattern of one/many/two which we examined in Section 3. In the case of gender categories, in the logic of secondness the masculine gender is first, to which the feminine is opposed, and the third, being opposed by analogy to both of the prior, is the so-called neuter gender. In the logic of thirdness, the neuter category in the concept of gender, like two in the concept of number, becomes the frame of reference. His characterization of the relation among these categories as "heterogeneous" when he usually describes them as opposing categories is curious. It is also curious that he mentioned the possibility of the third gender in this example when there is no neuter gender in either Arabic or Spanish and the concept of neuter gender, a logical contradiction in itself, plays no role at all in this example or in the context from which it is taken.

I suspect he does not want to explicitly state or obviously imply that the masculine gender is taken by language as the prior, so he muddies the water with irrelevant heterogeneity and neutrality. There is no question that this fact is a politically controversial one, but political palatability of a fact is not a very reliable criterion for judging its validity. What is more to the point, conceptual priority is primarily a logically unpalatable fact and only secondarily a politically unpalatable one. But upon contemplation from the point of view of typological logic, the priority in this case can be seen to have a no more sinister foundation than the fact that birth, the process of biological division, is a biological function of the female among genders, just as the logic of division a function of the concept of two among the numbers. There are only two biological genders, and the birth function of female is a natural sign of secondness, leaving the masculine by functional default in the position of first. It would be absurd to interpret this priority as a function of biological fact, since it is a function of the logic of signs and not of the physical laws of secondness.

By saying that one of these "heterogeneous" categories is "chosen as the representative", when he could have said "one of the categories is the representative", he implies that "one of the categories is arbitrarily chosen", arbitrary, that is, in terms of his expectations of underlying conceptual symmetry.

And, he holds those symmetrical expectations in contradiction with his own explicitly stated knowledge that "the masculine usually appears to be the unmarked gender" (p. 39), a fact of markedness that is widely attested and well-known in linguistics. He himself gives evidence from Semitic, including Arabic and Hebrew, as well as from Tunica and Bulgarian. In addition, it is known to be a pervasive characteristic of all Indo-European languages, of which he mentions several examples, and he also gives statistical evidence of the greater frequency of masculine nouns in Spanish.

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33 Note that "heterogeneous" means "mixed gender".
Again, in another place in the same text, in contradiction with his own empirical 
evidence, he shows a persistence in expecting symmetry.

...for gender categories...Since these are largely or completely conventional semantically 
and differ in size of membership, it is entirely plausible that the gender labeled 
'masculine' in one language will be of much greater text frequency than the feminine in 
that language, while in another language, the relationship is reversed. We may 
hypothesize that in the first language the masculine will display the other characteristics 
of the marked category, which in the second it will rather be the feminine. (p. 67-68)

Although this hypothesis of conceptual symmetry contradicts his statement of conceptual 
asymmetry above, he offers no empirical evidence to contradict the above mentioned 
evidence, unless the following is taken as evidence.

A possible contrary instance is Oneida and other Iroquoian languages in which, 
according to Lounsbury, the feminine is the unmarked gender. (p. 39)

One wonders why he does not offer some of this contrary data in evidence of his contrary 
hypothesis, or at least cite a reference. The reason, I suggest, is that the motivation 
behind his persistent expectation and hypothecation of symmetry in oppositions is not 
derived from empirical evidence, but is in flat contradiction to all of the evidence which 
he himself cites. The source of these contradictory theoretical expectations is the premise 
that the one and only logically possible orientation of opposition is symmetrical diametric 
opposition.

In contrast with the above empirically gratuitous expectations and hypotheses that 
the pervasive formal asymmetry is a function of a perverse human tendency to arbitrarily 
choose one category over the other, in several places he asserts that the asymmetry must 
be studied from a strictly inductive point of view, as if that were what he is doing, when 
in fact he obviously assumes the frame of reference of symbolic logic and diametrical 
opposition.

Proceeding inductively for the moment, we do not predict which will be the more 
frequent, but we do expect that one or the other will be the more frequent in all 
languages. We thus have a statement of universal scope. If the available evidence 
indicates, as it does, that the singular category is the more frequent, we now call the 
singular the unmarked and the plural marked. (p. 33)

marked simply means definitionally less frequent and unmarked means more frequent (p. 67)

He asserts that while we will not predict, we will expect. What is the difference between 
a prediction and an expectation? 
As I have pointed out, if you proceed purely inductively, you can not expect anything. 
On the other hand, if you expect something, then you are no longer proceeding 
inductively. Actually he only appears to be proceeding inductively, because he has put 
out of mind and is not aware of the logical assumptions which are guiding his 
expectations and hypothetical predictions.
In addition to this fundamental confusion between the inductive and deductive points of view, there are several more specific confusions in this statement. First, if it is a matter of frequency, why call anything "marked", when "marked" clearly has a rather specific meaning which has nothing to do with statistical frequency. Second, the preponderance of the manifestations and evidence of markedness has nothing to do with frequency, such as asymmetrical neutralization or syncretization, which leaves all such uncountable phenomena unrelated to those manifestations of the asymmetry which can be counted, a concern which he himself recognizes.

*Why, for example, should the less frequent category be the one which is subject to syncretizations? (p. 63)*

Third, as he himself explained earlier in the same text (p. 14), the frequency distribution of these countable phenomena is predicted in the first place by Zipf's principle of least effort, whereby the forms that are least frequent are less frequent because they are less complex as measured by marks. How can you predict frequency from marks and marks from frequency? They cannot explain each other. Which leads us to the conclusion that frequency does not explain anything, a conclusion with which he also agrees, in conflict with himself.

*frequency is itself but a symptom and the consistent relative frequency relations which appear to hold for lexical items and grammatical categories are themselves in need of explanation. Such explanations will not, in all probability, arise from a single principle. (p. 70)*

In his back and forth self-contradictory struggle to describe and explain the asymmetrical phenomena of markedness, in his conflict between the facts of language and the implicit logical assumptions which preclude those facts, he touches on the very principle which he was looking for.

*Viewed psychologically there is perhaps justification for seeing a similarity between the implied, fundamental characteristic, that is the unmarked member, whether in phonology, grammar, or semantics, and the Gestalt notion of ground, the frequent, the taken-for-granted, whereas the marked character would answer to the figure in the familiar dichotomy. (p. 60)*

Here he touches on the relation of logical priority. He sees that the "ground" (the unmarked) is the foundation of the figure (the marked); that the unmarked is "the taken-for-granted"; that the unmarked is "implied" by the marked; that the unmarked is "fundamental" the marked is derived; and, that the greater statistical frequency of the unmarked is a consequence rather than a cause.

Another source of confusion about the standing of these "universals of language" as well as the specific laws of each language is the fact that there are many apparent violations of both. Therefore, it is worth examining some the apparent violations of the laws of pluralization for the purpose of clarifying this confusion. Upon investigation it
can be seen that such violations do not vitiate the validity or force of either kind of law in the least.

For convenience of reference, I repeat the language universal law of markedness and the specific law in English.

The singular is unmarked and the plural is marked.

Add {-s} to plural nouns.

There may be some confusion here between the three laws before us. The most general law of marking is the Law of Marks, which I stated above. We are not considering that law directly now, though obviously we are establishing the standing of that law in terms of the more specific example described here. The statement describing the markedness of plurals just given here, is a specific instance of the Law of Marks, but it is general in relation to the law of English, which is an even more specific instance of the Law of Marks. Thus, in order of generality, we have the language universal Law of Marks, the language universal law of markedness in plurals, and the law of pluralization in English.

One might suggest that we distinguish them in part by calling the specific law of English a "rule". But what is in question here is exactly what the difference is between a law and a rule. Or, in other words, the question is, how much of the law of English is really specific to English and how much is a function of the fundamental Law of Marks. Obviously, the fact that the suffix is added to the plural rather than the singular is a function of the Law of Marks. I will show later that the fact that it is a suffix rather than a prefix, for example, also follows from the Law of Marks. For the time being, I will refer to them all as laws, and try to distinguish them without undue expository complexity in the meantime.

As the first class of apparent exceptions to the general law of plurals, there are many languages which simply do not distinguish obligatorily in the grammar of nouns between the singular and plural, in which case, neither is marked or unmarked. As these languages are not exceptional to the central point of the universal law, the formulation of the law has in practice been modified to account for this class of languages by adding a contingency clause.

If a language has the obligatory categories of singular and plural, then the singular will be unmarked and the plural marked.

The contingency, to eliminate this class of apparent exceptions from the scope of the law and thereby preserve the validity of its intent, is incorporated into the law itself. However, it is a well known and obviously related fact that there is no language which has a plural category without a corresponding singular category. That is, it is not just the marking of the categories that is asymmetrical, but the possibility of categories is also asymmetrical according to the same pattern: A language can have a numerically undifferentiated category of nouns, but no language can have a plural category without also having a singular category. In order to state this language universal fact, we would apparently have to state another specific law.
If a language has a plural category, then it must also have a singular category.

It is obvious that these two laws are a function of the same underlying conceptual priority, but a law which is stated in terms of form cannot extend to the government of the existence or non-existence of categories. Thus is impossible from the point of view of form to express both universal facts in a single law, necessitating the fragmentation of principles, which implies the invalidity of the law. By contrast, from the point of view of typological logic, the exceptions being also predictable, "prove the rule" as the saying goes.

Furthermore, even if a language does not have obligatory distinctions, it is still possible to distinguish singular and plural in nouns, and in such cases there is still a formal asymmetry, in that the plural will be more marked. And further, in a language like English which does have obligatory distinctions of number in nouns, there are exceptions, such as "sheep", but all such exceptions are undifferentiated singulars and not plurals. And, in addition, when children learn their language, whether it is a language like English which does distinguish singular/plural or another language which does not, they always begin using all nouns in the singular. And, when adults make mistakes in speaking, they may inadvertently omit the plural suffix to get "two sack", but it is not possible to make the mistake of saying "one sacks". It is possible to say "one sacks", but not by mistake, unless there is some elaborate context which sets up an expectation on the basis of a pattern which would lead to such a form, such as a list: one axe, one fax, one wax, one sacks. But then such a mistake would be a function of that local pattern and not a spontaneous rule-governed slip of the tongue.

Each of these manifestations of the secondness of the plural category would appear to be an exception to the law of markedness in plurals and would necessitate an additional clause to the formal characterization of what is obviously a single underlying principle, and as the exceptions mount up the validity of the law is cast farther in doubt. But such exceptions are actually proof to the contrary. From the point of view of form, when a child fails to use the plural suffix, this would be a violation of the law of markedness which says that the plural must be marked. But the very reason that the child does not mark the plural proves exactly that there is such a rule. The child's mistake is defined as a mistake by the law of marking plurals. Every such exception then, should not be seen as an exception or a violation, but as evidence of the validity of the law.

The variety of "exceptions" which are evidence of formal asymmetries which are manifest in even such a simple example as the present one, suggest that the principle of asymmetry is not a function of this particular law of markedness, but is a much more general and basic one, of which this law is just one manifestation. These particular asymmetries are a function of the underlying asymmetry of the relation of priority as structured in the radial opposition of secondness, and not a function of the grammar of the singular/plural concept alone.

There is another class of apparent violations, in this case violations of the specific law of pluralization in English, which are sometimes taken to be violations of the general law of markedness also. For the most part, nouns in English conform to the law that plurals are marked with the suffix {-s}, though everyone is aware that there are exceptions. Less than 5% of English words violate the law, but it would be wrong to take
the rule as a statistical generalization. Each of the violations is a unique and specific case, as can be seen by looking at their history and their behavior in child language learning and speech errors. The individuality and categorical behavior of exceptions cannot be explained statistically.

In this regard, it must be recalled, and kept continually in mind, that the sense of law in thirdness is not the same as law in secondness. The latter are laws of brute being, of physical substance, and cannot be violated. But the laws of the symbolic level are like civil or criminal laws or the laws of a game, and hence, can be violated, though even there, not without consequences. The logic of the laws of thirdness, like everything in thirdness, is very peculiar. For example, given a law of thirdness, such as "Don't walk on the grass", it follows from such a law, contrary to its intent, since everyone knows that you can walk on the grass, that one probably would want to walk on the grass, or else no one would have bothered to state such a law. So, in effect, the very statement of the law constitutes an invitation to violate it. Unless, one is so confused that it is supposed that such a law has the force of nature behind it. By contrast, it is a law of secondness that you cannot walk on water, but no one would bother to say, "Don't walk on the water", because you can't do it anyway.

However, even natural law can apparently be violated, when considered in terms comparable to language laws. The latter are formulated unconsciously by small children, and are retained in that form. If we formulate the law of gravity in such terms, it might be something like this: You must keep on the ground. Obviously, there are any number of ways in which one can violate the law of gravity as stated in these terms, but these too are only apparent violations. In general, it is true that you must stay on the ground. And, ultimately, everything that goes up, must come down, one way or another. But in the meantime, it is possible to jump up in the air. Is this a violation of the law? In some sense it is, but it is only possible to violate it momentarily in this way. It cannot be sustained. Another kind of violation is that one can climb a tree or go upstairs in a house or even up to the top of a skyscraper. And one can even jump off of such a structure and be off of the ground for a relatively long time, before coming back to the ground. But, of course, sooner or later, one will come back to the ground, and so will those structures themselves. And these are not really violations anyway, because the position of the individual off of the ground is sustained by a structure which is on the ground. And, though not exhaustive of the possibly ways of apparently violating the law of gravity, we can mention finally the possibility of flying in hot air balloons or airplanes. Analogues of these three types of apparent violations of the law governing pluralization in English are also found.

In native English words, there are three major classes of exceptions to the rule of pluralization, exemplified by "ox/oxen", "mouse/mice", and "sheep/sheep". The first is exceptional in that it has the suffix "-en" in the plural instead of "-s", thus violating the law of English pluralization, but it does not violate the law of marking, because the plural is marked and the singular unmarked. In the other two classes, there is no marked difference in the complexity of the singular as compared to the plural. In "mouse/mice" the forms are different, but one is no more marked than the other and in "sheep/sheep" there is no difference at all. So they do violate the particular law of English, but not the general law of marking.
Now, what is most telling about these exceptions, is the pattern that is manifest when people make mistakes in their use. The mistakes can be seen to be governed, and to be revealing about the nature of the rules that are and are not violated, and how they are violated. In other words, exceptions are patterned in such a way as to be determined by and thus to prove the laws that are violated.

There are different varieties of mistakes, but the most natural and systematic are seen in the transparently rule-governed mistakes of children learning their language, in which the mistakes are either a function of not knowing a rule or of over-generalizing the rule to forms which are irregularly exceptional to that rule, such as the examples above. In fact, in some ways it is wrong to call them mistakes in children, because they correctly reflect the systematic progressive refinement of the rules of a language from the most general to the particular.

In general, the relevant pattern of such mistakes progresses from the non-marking of anything, to the marking of all plurals according to the rule, whether correct or not, and then to the one-by-one learning of the arbitrary exceptions. It would be logically possible for a child to begin with the plural, but they never do. And it would be logically possible for the child to extend the rule to some forms and not others or to generalize from exceptional forms to regular ones, but they never do. And the same asymmetric pattern holds for speech mistakes in general.

At the first possible stage, a child will not use plurals at all, saying for example.

*I saw one dog and then two dog
*I saw one house and then two house

These sentences are incorrect in English (indicated by ")*, but this is the pattern of a possible language, and a possible type of mistake in adults.

At the second stage, the child will correctly learn the general rule in English and will say,

I saw one dog and then two dogs
I saw one house and then two houses.

It is predicted by the law of markedness that there could not possibly be any language or any stage of child language development or any possible mistakes either in child or adult language such as the following.

!*I saw one dogs and then two dog
!*I saw one houses and then two house

(Where "!*" indicates that it is impossible.) Another way of saying this is that if someone knows how to form the plural, then they know how to form the singular, but not vice versa: it is quite possible to know the form of the singular without knowing the form of the plural. A mistake such as "two dog" is possible, but "one dogs" is not. It is possible to say the latter form, but it cannot be by mistake. It can only come about through intentional perversity, of the sort which is necessary to do linguistics.
The prediction of correctness and incorrectness is a function of the law or rule of a particular language. And, the prediction of possibility or impossibility is a function of the universal law of markedness. What this suggests is that the former are laws of thirdness, of the order of game-like laws, whereas the latter are laws of secondness, of the order of natural law. In order to illustrate the patterns predicted by these two types of law, let me spell out their predictions in detail.

It is possible that a child learning English when first learning the rule could over generalize it incorrectly to singular forms as follows, but since the suffix would have no coherent semantic function, this stage would be very unstable, so there could be no such language. Not impossible, but pointless.

*I saw one dogs and then two dogs
*I saw one houses and then two houses

Thus such a structure is a possible mistake in English, by a kind of analogy of the first noun with the second, but ungrammatical in English.

If we generate the predicted paradigm for one regular word in English, we would get in the order of refinement of learning and the order of a child's error.

*I saw one dog and then two dog
*I saw one dogs and then two dogs
I saw one dog and then two dogs

*I saw one dogs and then two dog

Here the first is possible, and normal in some languages, but incorrect in English, being a function of the lack of a rule of pluralization. The second is possible, but is a function of a semantically meaningless and partial apprehension of the rule, which would say, "attach -s to nouns". The third is possible and correct in English, but the fourth is not possible in any language. Thus the first two are possible mistakes in English, but the fourth is not even possible as a mistake in any language.

Taking the irregular word "sheep", the following order of possibilities is predicted.

I saw one sheep and then two sheep
*I saw one sheeps and then two sheeps
*I saw one sheep and then two sheeps
I saw one sheep and then two sheep

*I saw one sheeps and then two sheep

The first is accidentally correct, because the child, not knowing the rule yet, uses all singular forms; the second is incorrect by incoherence of the rule; the third is the correct application of the rule, but as this particular word is an unpredictable exception it is incorrect in this word. The fourth is correct, and identical to the first, but this time
intended, rather than accidental. The first two incorrect sentences are possible mistakes, but the last is impossible in any language and is not a possible mistake.

It is instructive to compare the above paradigm of possibilities with that of a regular noun which is nearly homophonous.

*I heard one beep and then two beep
*?I heard one beeps and then two beeps
I heard one beep and then two beeps

!*I heard one beeps and then two beep

Here the first is incorrect, but possible; the second pointless, but possible; the third correct, and, of course possible. And, once again, the last pattern is impossible in any language and an impossible mistake.

The paradigm of possibilities for the irregular "ox" is as follows.

*I saw one ox and then two ox
*?I saw one oxes and then two oxes
*I saw one ox and then two oxes

*I saw one oxen and then two oxen
*I saw one oxen and then two oxens
I saw one ox and then two oxen

!*I saw one oxen and then two ox
!*I saw one oxes and then two ox

The first three are the same expected sequence of child error. The second set of three happen after he learns the plural rule and encounters the exceptional nature of this word. They are all possible. The last two are not possible.

Compare the above paradigm with that of the nearly homophonous, but regular noun, "axe".

*I saw one axe and then two axe
*?I saw one axes and then two axes
I saw one axe and then two axes

!*I saw one axe and then two axen
!*I saw one axen and then two axes
!*I saw one axen and then two axens
!*I saw one axes and then two axen
!*I saw one axen and then two axe

The first three are the normal and possible evolution of possibilities and the first two are possible mistakes. After the plural rule has been learned, the fourth is an impossible
mistake. The last three are impossible in any language and not possible mistakes, the last being doubly impossible, if one can speak in this manner.

The paradigm of the remaining kind of irregular form is this.

*I saw one mouse and then two mouse
*?I saw one mouses and then two mouses
*I saw one mouse and then two mouses

!*I saw one mouse and then two mouse

*I saw one mice and then two mice
*I saw one mice and then two mouse
I saw one mouse and then two mice.

!*I saw one mouses and then one mouse

The first three are the usual possibilities seen in the learning of the rule. The fourth is not a possible mistake, once the rule has been learned. The next three indicate that the child has learned the exceptional form of the plural, but it is possible to make a mistake by overgeneralizing the plural form or by getting them backwards, since their difference is relatively arbitrary. The last is neither possible in any language, nor a possible mistake.

Finally, compare the paradigm of a nearly homophonous, but regular noun.

*I saw one house and then two house
*?I saw one houses and then two houses
I saw one house and then two houses

!*I saw one house and then two house

*!! I saw one house and then two hice
*!! I saw one hice and then two house
*!!! I saw one house and then two hices
*!!! I saw one hice and then two houses
*!!! I saw one houses and then two hice
*!!! I saw one hices and then two house
*!!! I saw one hices and then two hice

The first three are once again the normal possibilities of error and of language. The fourth is not possible once the rule of pluralization has been learned. And the last group, which is not an exhaustive listing of the logical possibilities, are sometimes described in technical terms in linguistics as "word salad". One does not have to make an extensive empirical investigation to be convinced that these impossible forms are not merely impossible as a function of the game-like laws of language, but to imagine someone actually saying any of these sentences by mistake, is like supposing that someone could fall up by mistake. It becomes evident that what we are talking about here is not
violations of conventions, but of the laws of nature. One simply cannot do it. Even by mistake.
5.1 ON THE MARK

The easy and natural acceptance of the ordinary word "mark" to describe and explain the formal asymmetries found in language is a result of the intuitive recognition of the fact that the structures so named actually do function as marks in the ordinary sense of the word. There a deep resonance of familiarity between the intuitive sense of the word and the language phenomenon of markedness. It is no accident that this word has come to be the name of this phenomenon and it is not merely a metaphor or an analogy. The language phenomenon is marking in the normal literal ordinary sense of the word.

This offers us the advantage of being able to investigate the very complex, abstract, and intellectually alien phenomena of marking in language in terms of the relatively simple, concrete, and comfortable home ground of this ordinary garden variety word. It is a common native English word, and for that reason it is deep, solid, and luxuriant in intuitive value. Thus we can profitably and comfortably dig under the surface of the phenomenon of marking in language in terms of the word "mark", the concept of the mark, and the use of the word in ordinary English.

But, there is an attendant disadvantage, which we must take into consideration, stated a little too strongly for the present case, but still to the point, in the common saying, "familiarity breeds contempt". It is normal, since language is so close to us, for familiar words to be taken for granted and for our feeling for them to become ossified. In the beginning of our relationship to a word, it comes to us as a foreign object, it is a problem to be reconciled, it poses a challenge, it occupies our attention, it is entertaining and enjoyable. But, once we have mastered it, integrated it into our everyday thinking, and come to use it routinely, it fades from our conscious attention and recedes into the background. Our relation to the word becomes progressively more automatic and unthinking and rigid and narrow, and as a consequence, the underlying intuitive value of the word is lost from sight and frozen in habitual automatism.

Therefore, we must dig beneath the surface and open up the meaning of the word. We must revivify and rejuvenate the intuitive value of the word by focusing our attention on it while we turn it this way and that, exploring its divided and compartmentalized facets. We must gain a feeling for the deep underlying sense of the words so that it can provide a broad and solid frame of reference in terms of which we can appreciate the variety of marking phenomena in language, and in other modes of symbolic interaction.

Our purpose is not to arrive at a precise definition in the fashion of a dictionary, like a police description of a suspected criminal who no one knows personally. That method of trying to capture and pin down a word is incapable of developing a friendly and useful feeling for the sense of the word. It rather has the contrary effect of driving it away and dividing it up into enumerated cells in which are nothing but symbolic representations of its character and personality. One looks up a word, which leads to another word, and one is eventually led back to the original word empty handed. It is impossible to gain a direct intuitive sense of the word in this way.

We do not need to consult the dictionary to find out what the word means, because we already know the word, though we can use the dictionary as a source of suggested uses, examples, cross-references, and etymological information. We should
think of the idea of a word as a frame of mind, a scene or landscape which is already present in our mind, which we can look over and select prominent qualities or features to focus our attention on. It is not a matter of inventing or creating or finding out something new; it is a matter of exploring something that is present before us, though, like an ancient city, its features are hidden beneath the dust and detritus of neglect.

The dictionary gives many different definitions and uses of the word "mark", but underlying the superficial variety of uses is the etymologically original idea of a boundary. Since the idea of a boundary is so ordinary, one might suppose that it is pretty clear, but it is not. It is an extremely elusive concept. A boundary is the same idea as frame of reference, and if you will recall from our discussion of frame of reference in Section 3, I pointed out that the usual idea of a frame of reference, now in the guise of a boundary, as being like a picture frame which surrounds an object, is inadequate. A frame of reference is not distinct either in logic or in its function from a point of reference or a standard of measure, and ultimately all of these concepts are logically equivalent to an assumed premise. A boundary may be considered to be chronologically simultaneous with the object which it bounds, but it is logically and conceptually prior.

Even in the spatial sense, a boundary serves to define not only the spatial limits of an object, but also to define the conceptual type of the object, and therefore, its identity, character, origin, authority, or potentially any other attribute. A boundary between nations distinguishes between nations, not between counties, so in bounding it also identifies what kind of thing it bounds. A picture frame not only is the boundary of the picture, but tells you that it is a picture and not a part of the wall. A question mark tells you where the end of the sentence is and also tells you that it is a sentence and not a country or a picture and it also tells you that it is a question.

This last example gives us the opportunity to point out that we must distinguish between a boundary and an object or substance which may or may not be used to mark it. Not all boundaries are marked, but all marks are marks of boundaries. The boundary between the U.S. and Canada is marked in very few places, and yet there is a boundary of several thousand miles. A picture does not have a frame while it is being painted, nor quite possibly even when it is displayed in a gallery. It is a conventional regulation in English writing to mark the beginning of every sentence with a capital letter and the end with some kind of punctuation mark, but that is only a recent innovation, and it is not objectively necessary. a written sentence would have a beginning and an end whether it was marked or not.

It is conventional to confuse an object, its boundary, and the boundary marker, if there is one. In saying it is "conventional", rather than saying that it often happens, I mean to convey the point that the confusion is not an accident; it is integral and necessary to the conceptual machinery of language. This confusion in the function of language is precisely the same logical confusion which is known in logic as the error of logical typing. This confusion is the source of symbolic value and force in language, where one thing is taken to have the value of something else. An object, its boundary, and the mark of its boundary are three logical, as well as material, types of phenomena: A picture is made of canvas and paint; the limits of the picture are not made of anything; and the frame, if there is one, is made of wood, let us say. The frame is not intended to be taken as a work of art in itself, though it may be one. It is not intended to be taken as anything
in itself, but is intended rather to categorize, or type, the picture as a picture. Conceptually, the material wood substance which marks the boundary is exchanged for the nothing which the boundary actually consists of. That is, in the mind of the observer, the boundary of the picture is taken as being wood, when in fact it is nothing, and the wood is taken as being the boundary of the picture, when in fact it is wood.

This tendency to exchange and confuse one logical type with another under the influence of the symbolic mode of transaction is obviously a pervasive and persistent tendency. It may be observed in passing that it is an asymmetrical exchange of something which is present and physically tangible (the picture frame) for something which is not present and not tangible (the boundary). And, since the confused exchange of the value of the boundary and the value of the object and the value of the mark is the essence of the symbolic process, it is the crux of the difficulty in the analysis of language in general and the mark in particular. It is not something which we can avoid in our analysis of the concept of the mark, so if we are going to be able to make sense of that concept, we must constantly anticipate this confusion and consistently separate logical types. In using language continuously and automatically, the tendency to confuse types becomes so automatic that we are not aware that we are doing it. This is the major obstacle to understanding the concept and function of the mark.

But at the same time, under the surface of our unthinking and uncritical absorption in the symbolic exchange, we all know that a picture, its boundary, and the picture frame are not the same. It is not as if we had to discover something which we never knew. So once it is clear that this symbolic confusion is what we are concerned with, and once we focus our attention of this aspect of the process and slow down the automatism, it is easy to sort them out.

The foregoing discussion is coming at the problem of boundaries from the symbolic point of view. If one looks closely at the physical world, one discovers, as physics and the other hard sciences have done, that there are no objectively ascertainable discrete natural physical boundaries in the physical world. There are actually no discretely separated objects, but rather dynamic systems of energy. What humans and other animals perceive as discrete objects with sharp boundaries are just that: perceptions. The existence of boundaries is a function of the interplay of brute forces with the organs of perception. What comes to be perceived as a discrete boundary, or an object with such a boundary, depends on how the forces and interactions of forces strike upon our senses in relation to our interests and appetites.

In the most primitive sense, it is the striking effect of brute forces which establishes the brute fact of an object and the mark of its boundary. In the physical world it is not the boundary which is first, but it is the force of conflict which marks a boundary as an impression on our senses and in our experience as a boundary. A boundary is a locus of conflict and a mark is the impression of that conflict.

The first definition of "mark" in my dictionary is this.

A sign, symbol, or visible impression.

When you look up "impression", you find this.

The effect, mark, or imprint made on a surface by pressure.
And under the verb, "impress" is this.

To mark or stamp with or as if with pressure...To affect or influence deeply or forcibly.

In the most basis brute physical sense, then, a mark is an image that has impressed itself on our senses and our memory by dint of the force through which we experience it.

The fundamental boundary is between our senses and the object which forces itself and consequently its image upon us. If a physical object strikes us with great force and impresses us deeply, the visual image of that object makes a correspondingly deep impression in our memory. Thus the perceptible boundary of that forceful object, the outline of the object, becomes the image which now marks its identity. The image which we have retained of the object now serves to identify it and when we see that image we know we are approaching the boundary of conflict and the forthcoming experience of its force.

Note the above definition says that a mark is a sign or a symbol. It is not true that a mark is a symbol, but it is one of the indispensable elements of a symbol in a way which we will discuss later. A mark, however, is a sign, in fact, all marks are signs. But not all signs are marks.

Given the fact that all marks are signs, perhaps we can clarify the above observation. The foregoing description of the most primitive sense of marking is that the perceptual image of an object that creates a forceful impression on us is the mark of that object in our memory. In other words, what we perceive of an object is a mark of that object. Or in short, an object marks itself by its image in our perception. This is not a normal use of the word "mark", but in a trivial sense it is quite reasonable: The perceptual image of a bear is a sign of a bear, and is a sign which we are likely to mark well, if we should ever encounter one up close.

The abnormality of this usage corresponds to the abnormality of saying that an object refers to itself or that the force of an object is that of itself. Normally, we would not say these things; we would just say, for example, "that is a bear". Note that not only do we not bother to say it, but it is actually ungrammatical to say

*That bear is being itself.

It is grammatical, but not normal to say,

That bear is manifesting itself
That bear looks like itself
That bear gives the image of itself
That bear is referring to itself
That bear has the force of itself

Peirce discussed this kind of pseudo-duality, calling it "degenerate Secondness" (1.365); degenerate in that it appears to be a relation between two things, but since the two are not independent, they are not two things. Of course, we are just looking here at the relation
between the object and its image, but when you add the observer, it is a pseudo-relation between three things, and is the same as the examples of degenerate thirdness, or analogical thirdness, which we saw above. The relation between the bear and its perceptual image is that of resemblance, which is the prototype of the iconic sign function.

Such are all resemblances: for any two objects in nature resemble each other, and indeed in themselves just as much as any other two; it is only with reference to our senses and needs that one resemblance counts for more than another.

Identity is the relation that everything bears to itself: Lucullus dines with Lucullus...An echo is my own voice coming back to answer itself. So also, we speak of the abstract quality of a thing as if it were some second thing that the first possesses.

He also calls these kind of relationships, "self-relations", or "internal" as opposed to "external seconds", which arise from the mind setting one part of a notion into relation to another.

And, note that in the above quote he speaks of the pseudo-relation of self-resemblance and the consequent division of one thing into two parts, such as the division between the bear and the image of the bear, as being "only with reference to our senses and needs" and in relation to these pseudo-seconds we speak of allurements and motives in the language of forces, as though a man suffered compulsion from within. So with the voice of conscience: and we observe our own feelings by a reflective sense. An echo is my own voice coming back to answer itself. So also we speak of the abstract quality of a thing as if it were some second thing that the first possessed.

When we think of the force of a bear which impresses the image of a bear on our memory, where it is retained after the passing on of the bear as the mark of a bear, we think of force as being a property of the bear alone. However, in principle, force is a relation between two things; for force to be manifest in tangible form it must strike against an opposing force of the same nature which is weaker. For example, the striking or pressing force of a signant can impress wax with its mark, but it cannot impress stone or even less water or even less air or even less beauty. What we perceive and experience as force can be summed up as the ability to impress. Thus, the impression of force is a function of relative weakness and malleability, which in living things is in turn a function of physical and other abilities, needs, desires, appetites, or in short, "allurements and motives".

When we speak of the image of the bear being the mark of the bear, it is not a mark when that image is the actual percept of an actual bear. Then the image is a epiphenomenal manifestation of the bear in our perception, but when the image is brought forth from memory in the absence of a bear, then it makes sense to say that it refers to, has the value of, and marks a bear as a more or less permanent impression in our memory.

The triviality of saying that the image is the "mark" is that we usually think of a mark as a object which does not refer to itself, but rather to something else. And, we do not normally think of the perceptual image of an object as being different from the object itself, although we all know it is different. It is not false to say that an object of some force marks itself, but it is self-evident that the presence of an object signifies its own presence, so it is something that goes without saying. If you are in the presence of the
object itself, then there is no motivation for introducing the complexity of an intervening mark.

Having noted the triviality of the use of "mark" in this way, it brings us to the observation that in the normal use of the word, a mark is an object which we can see, because it is present, and that object is a sign of something which we cannot see, because that other thing is not present. The thing which is referred to by the mark might not be present in any number of different ways. It may be physically present but out of the awareness or attention of the observer, or it might be present in time but beyond the horizon of perception at the moment, or it may have been present in the past, or it may be expected to be present in the future, or it may be intrinsically imperceptible, or it may be a figment of our imagination. Each of these possible modes of absence give rise to somewhat different uses of marks and of the word "mark", but all of them are fundamentally a mediation of the boundary between what is present and what is not present.

Ontogenetically, the prototypical object which is not present the mother, the prototypical other. The mother is the prototypical embodiment of power in relation to the utter dependence of the infant, who's mind is the malleable substance which is impressed with the marks of his language and society through the interplay of this power and dependence. It is very instructive to consider the ontogeny of language in these terms. Freud's observation of the German child learning his first phonemic distinctions in the game the child invented and played, though brief, is pregnant with insight for linguistics. The child enacted his mother's going and coming by throwing away and retrieving a spool attached to a string while saying alternatively, "fort" and "da". Many of the linguistic implications of this complex relationship between the child, mother, spool, and language, have been extensively elaborated in various works of Jacques Lacan. In his game, the child is symbolically able to manipulate and master the presence and absence of the desired object through the manipulation of the spool. As soon as he masters his mother tongue, he will be able to do so just as successfully through the manipulation of sound alone.

It is important enough to mention again that what is being mediated is absence, and to emphasize that it is not mere physical absence, but the absence of a desired object. It is the desire together with the absence which creates the breach or gap which is mediated by the mark. The absence of the object externally corresponds to a presence of an internal lack or hunger or deficiency of some kind. In the absence of the desired object, the mark mediates and speaks to the lack as a sign of the object.

The relation in which the mark comes to play a role as a third element is between the observer as the second and that which he lacks as the first. There many significant aspects of this three-way relationship which should be examined, but we will not attempt to do so exhaustively here. We may note, first, that the essence of the relation is between the first and the second: The third is only relevant as long as the second is absent from the first; once you get the food, the menu is cast aside. By the dynamic of tension in the relation between desire and absence, we introduce the possibility of the mediation of a mark, and thus, three external relationships: The relation between the observer and the object; the relation between the observer and the mark; and the relation between the object and the mark. We may note that where the second is absent in relation to the first, the third, the mark, must be present in relation to the second in order to function as a
mediating sign which guides the second to the desired first. And, the mark must also be in some kind of relation with the second, even if it is only an imagined relation, in order to refer to it.

In regard to these properties of the mark, we should point out that one must distinguish between the phenomenological type of the thing which functions as a mark and the type of sign-function by which a mark refers to the object. Although there are marks which function as signs of all three types - icon, index, and symbol - all signs, and thus all marks, must consist of brute substance and brute force. That is, whereas a sign may refer to something by a relation of firstness (resemblance of appearance or quality) or by a relation of secondness (some direct physical relation) or by a relation of thirdness (a stipulated conventional relation), any object or substance which functions as a sign can only be of the phenomenological type of secondness.

As we saw in Section 2.1, the phenomenological type of firstness is not physically apprehensible, and thus can play no overt and direct role in the embodiment of a sign. When we say that a sign is something which is present, we mean that it must consist of brute being which exerts at least some minimal degree of brute force upon our senses. Firstness does not assert itself directly and overly in brute force, for if it did, it would no longer be firstness, just as in language, a presupposition that is asserted is no longer a presupposition.

And, as we saw in Section 2.2, the phenomenological type of thirdness is that of game-like law, or conventional law. A law cannot be perceived either, and in fact it is the symbolic function of marks to physically embody and physically convey symbolic law, so marks cannot consist of law. So, all signs and all marks, must be physically embodied in brute being.

When one considers the idea of the mark in a general way, the most remarkable property of the idea, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, is that it is imbued with a negative value. (I do not mean negation.) The idea of the mark is tainted with an aura of unpleasantness, or weakness, or error, or damage, or even death. The specific character of negativity varies in quality and in intensity; In some uses it is hardly perceptible, though in almost all instances it can be found lurking in the background; In other uses, it is the most prominent feature of the meaning. Here I will survey some of the uses of the word "mark" to illustrate this negative quality, and I will return to explain the reason for this gloomy aura later on, but one should keep this in mind and look for it throughout, because it is an intrinsic aspect of the mark.

The mark of Cain is the sign of a man who murdered his brother. And in the expression, "a marked man", according to my dictionary, is a man who is "singled out, especially for a dire fate". My understanding is that it means that he is marked for death. A "marker" is defined as something that marks or distinguishes, as a bookmark, tombstone, or milestone.

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34 I am using The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 1969 edition, as I mentioned above. It should be noted that in this dictionary, as in all others, there is a great deal of cooking of the raw and ugly and unpleasant implications of words. What I have gleaned below is all the more remarkable in view of this tendency to "purify" out unpleasantness.
and also as an "I.O.U." An I.O.U. is called a "marker" especially in illegal private usurious loans by loan sharks and often result in death or worse. "Monument" is defined as an

inscribed stone or other marker placed at a grave or tomb; tombstone

There are, of course, memorial markers for all sorts of events or persons, but they almost always are erected after the event or person has passed. Memorial markers of death are far more common than memorials of birth and memorials of lost battles far more common than of victories, except for Pyrrhic victories.

The expression "to mark up" is ambiguous, interestingly, between "to cut or scratch repeatedly" and "to raise the price". Of course, the Mark is a unit of German currency, the same root in the Finnish "markka", and it used to be a monetary unit in England and Scotland. It also used to be a standard of weight for gold and silver. "Market" comes from the same root as "mark" via Latin and means as a noun, the place where things are bought and sold, and as a verb, to put something up for sale. There is no overt negativity in the use of the word "mark" in relation buying and selling or to money and gold, but there is plenty of force and violence, as well as alienation and slavery and colonization, in the transaction of marks in markets as Marx, for example, has amply argued.

If one opens a conversation by saying the following,

He does not have a mark on him

one might wonder who "he" refers to, but without even knowing that, it would be taken to mean that whoever he might be, he was not bruised or cut or wounded (or, in Germany, that he did not have any money). And, since there is no word in the sentence which has any semantic content but "mark", this idea of destructiveness must derive form that word alone. Without negation,

He has a mark on his face

means that there is something unnatural and undesirable there. One might suppose at first sight that a "beauty mark" is a counter-example, but such a mark consists of either a small natural flaw, such as a mole, or an artificial spot stuck on an otherwise beautiful face. The mark is not itself considered to be beautiful, nor is it a sign that denotes beauty. It is a tiny piece of ugliness on the face which is taken to highlight by contrast the surrounding beauty of the face.

In relation to the "beauty mark" or "spot", we might note that the first definition of "spot" is where it is used as a neutral term of location, as "this is a nice spot".

A particular place of relatively small and definite limits.

However, "to be on the spot" is defined in my dictionary innocuously as "Under pressure or attention; in a pressed position", though in my understanding it means to be in a very difficult and weak position, as, for example, in the hands of the authorities because one is
regarded as guilty of a crime or failing of some kind, and, they have proof. "Something hits the spot" means to be "just what is needed", i.e., precisely what is lacking. "Spotty" means "lacking consistency". The second definition given for "spot" is

A mark on a surface differing sharply in color from the surroundings; especially a stain or blot.

"Blot" is defined as a "disgrace" as a noun and "to obliterate; cancel" and "to destroy utterly; annihilate" as a verb.

Without any prior context, if one says,

He does not have a mark against him

it means that he has not done anything wrong. Closely related to this sense, in the dictionary, "to mark a test" is said to have the neutral meaning, "to grade", but generally speaking, one only marks factual error, incorrect spelling or grammar, etc. One does not mark correctness, correct spelling, or correct grammar. In this use, a mark is precisely a sign of incorrectness. In the same way, in linguistics, the convention has developed of marking grammatically incorrect sentences when used as examples with the mark "*=", but correct sentences are not marked.

When we say,

He is a mark

we have gone from speaking of marks as being on something or someone to speaking of someone as being a mark. In this use, it means that he is "an easy target for swindlers", a dupe, a sucker, a goat, a stupid man who is easily fooled and thus likely to loose in a contest of wits. This is also related to the verb, "spot", according to the dictionary,

To yield as a handicap: "spotted their opponents 11 points".

In the same sense we use “mark” in the word “marksman”, which is someone who can shoot a gun accurately at a target, where the target is the mark. In the same sense, "on the mark" (also, interestingly, "on the money") means to hit the target. My dictionary gives the example, "A mounted officer would be a conspicuous mark", meaning "target". "He is an easy mark", means that it is easy to kill him, or borrow money from him, or swindle him, which brings us back to the meaning of dupe, fool, sucker, or goat.

Related to the meaning of "target", the dictionary defines "mark" as "something aimed at or desired", "that which one wishes to achieve; a goal", and "an object or point that serves as a guide". "Goal" is defined as an "end; objective" and in Middle English meant "boundary, limit" as does "end" in modern English.

However, as we saw in the last paragraph, it is one thing to look at a mark or to seek to attain a mark, but quite another to be a mark. The derogatory sense of being a mark is due to the relation between the mark itself and the lack which it mediates. "Lack" is defined as a "deficiency or absence", thus someone who is a mark thereby manifests a corresponding "deficiency" in wits or strength or some other handicap which makes him
an easy target. "Deficient" is defined as "Lacking an essential quality or element" and is synonymous with "defective" which means to have a defect, which is defined as "the lack of something necessary or desirable" and "a failing or fault". "To defect" is defined as

To leave, without consent or permission, an allegiance which one had espoused or acknowledged.

"Defect" is said to be synonymous with "blemish", "fault", "flaw", and we can add "spot", and "mark".

"Fault" is defined as a "mistake; error" and in geology is a "break in the continuity of a rock formation" that is, a boundary. Errors are said to be out of bounds, and thus one can see that the underlying sense of lack, deficiency, defect, blemish, fault, flaw, spot, etc. is a discontinuity, a break in continuity between the second and the first, which is the boundary which is marked. And, discontinuities are classically considered in military strategy to be points of weakness, hence a mark is a target, dupe, or sucker.

Under the entry for "intention" the synonyms listed are

intent, purpose, object, goal, end, aim, objective
to which we could add "boundary" and "mark". "Intent" is defined as

having the attention applied; engrossed...Having the mind fastened upon some purpose

which means, since the end or objective is absent, that to intend or to be intent is having the mind absorbed in that which is absent, engrossed in that which is lacking. Etymologically, it comes from Latin intendere "to stretch out toward" and is related to "intense" and "tense". Thus to be intent on a goal is to be stretched out in tension from the position of lack toward the objective which can fulfill that lack. Tension in itself is a weakness, because it is a manifestation of internal conflict. Being stretched out is also a weakness, because a force which is concentrated is more difficult to attack than a force which is stretched out. A rigid fixation in any position is a weakness, because flexibility is more able to withstand force than rigidity. A fixation on what is absent is at the expense of what is present, and thus is another weakness. All of these are natural inherent consequences of being a second lacking a first and as such intrinsically mark secondness as a weakness, for which reason a mark is a sign of weakness.

A "blemish" is defined as a "mar", which is a curious word.
The word "mar" means "to deface", "to spoil the quality of", and is a synonym of "injure". The form and meaning of this word is suspiciously similar to "mark", and thereby suggests at least an association in folk etymology, if not in etymological fact, assuming that they are distinct. According to my dictionary these two words are not related historically: "Mar" is said to come from the Proto-Indoeuropean root mer-4 and "mark" from merg-, though that does not close the book on the question.

I am not an Indoeuropeanist, but I know enough about it to know that it would be a small matter to relate those two roots by known processes of suffixation and derivation. And, though my dictionary distinguishes between mer-4 and mer-2, it seems suspicious
because the former only has one descendant, namely, "mar", while the latter is a hodge-podge of two roots, phonologically identical, but distinguished in Pokorny. The differential relations between these roots are cast further in doubt by the fact that almost all of the listed descendants of mer-2 are described as possible or probable.

What I am suggesting is that these three roots are really variants of the same original root. Assuming that this is so, though it is a question that would have to be decided by someone more competent in Indoeuropean comparative linguistics, it would explain the remarkably coincidental similarity in both meaning and form between "mark", "mar", and the descendants of mer-2. This root means "to rub away, harm" and listed as descendants are Greek marainein, "to waste away, wither", from which English borrowed "marasmus" and "amaranth"; "mortar" from Latin mortarium, "ground down"; also borrowed from Latin and referring to death are "mortal", "mortify", "mortuary", etc.; borrowed from Greek, "ambrosia", is morphologically equivalent to "im-mortal", i.e., "not-die", and thus comes to mean "divine"; and finally the native English word, "murder".

Recall that we observed above that all signs and marks must consist of some kind of physical embodiment. In regard to the aura of negativity and even violence which imbues the idea of the mark, it is interesting and significant to see what the dictionary says about the different kinds of tangible physical embodiment a mark can consist of. The following is an exhaustive examination of all of the different modes of physical embodiment mentioned under the heading "mark" in the dictionary which I am using.

In the definition quoted at the beginning of this discussion, a mark is said to be "a visible impression", and as a verb, "to make a visible impression on". And, the verb "impress" is defined as, "to mark or stamp with pressure" and "to affect or influence deeply or forcibly". In Latin, the word literally means "to press into." The dictionary also mentions "stamp" as a synonym of mark, which means "to strike with force." Thus "to mark" in these related senses means to distort the surface of something by exerting pressure or striking the object with sufficient force to leave a remaining mark.

The word "seal" is defined as a "die or signant having a raised or incised emblem used to stamp an impression upon a receptive substance such as wax or lead." As an act, then, "to seal" is in the same class as the foregoing, exerting force by pressure. Etymologically, "seal" was borrowed into English through French from Latin. The root of the word appears variously in Latin as sequi, "to follow" which was borrowed into English through French as "second", and directly from Latin as "sequence", "consequent", and "subsequent", all of which imply that a seal is the mark of a second; signum, meaning "sign or symbol"; and socius from which our word "society" comes.

The dictionary mentions that a mark can be in the form of an "inscription", which, as we saw in Section 2.2 is a kind of violence, as are all words which refer to writing. "Inscribe" means literally "to scratch in", thus leaving a remaining mark on the surface of something.

A mark is defined as a "visible trace", the latter word being defined as "a visible mark or sign of the former presence of passage of some person, thing, or event". It is a sign that is present, a tangible part or effect of an object which remains behind when the object goes away. A trace could be some small part of the object, such as its smell, or hair, or feces, or blood, in which case that part has become separated from the object, as a
third thing which refers to the object and thus mediates in time between the absence of
object and the presence of the observer; in this sense an intrinsic part of the object
becomes an extrinsic mark. A trace could also be embodied in an originally extrinsic
third thing through the effect of the object on that thing, such as a footprint, which is an
impression, or flattened grass, or a broken branch, or remnants of a fire, or left over food,
etc. In other words, the lacking object must physically disturb the shape or pattern of the
physical substance of something in the environment which would not have been there
except for the intrusion of the object. Note that whatever functions as a trace must stand
out from the background phenomena as being otherwise unexplainable. Thus a trace is a
mark which is either a separated and abandoned part of the object or an intrusive
disturbance of some other thing in the environment.

Etymologically, the word "trace" comes from Latin tractus "to drag or pull", a
sense that is clear in the borrowed English words "tractor" and "traction". The same root
is seen also in "tract", referring to a piece of land, probably by way of marking its
boundary; the same word "tract" also means "a pamphlet containing a declaration or
appeal", the sense of the word referring to the rhetorical force, or more specifically, its
pulling power. In the dictionary, this meaning is said to come from Latin "tractare to
pull violently, discuss". And, the same root is in "extract" meaning "to pull out
violently", "distract" meaning "to pull apart violently", and "contract".

Without being aware of the persistence of this quality of negativity and violence
in words of marking and writing one would be surprised to find that such innocuous
seeming words as "trace", "tract", etc. have such violent associations and etymological
roots. One would, in that case, be all the more surprised to find that the same pattern of
associations is found in the semantically equivalent but etymologically unrelated English
word "draw". Recall that the Latin root tract was defined as "drag or pull". "Drag" was a
morphological variant of "draw" in Old English. The sense of force and general
negativity is much more obvious in "drag", which has the overt sense of pulling
something against its resistance. It is also used to refer to something or someone which
impedes or holds one back, thus "a drag" is an unpleasant person. But, for some reason,
"drag" is never used to refer to the drawing of a picture.

"Draw" means "to pull", but it is also used to refer to various kinds of writing or
making lines or images. One can draw a picture or "portray by lines, words, or imitative
actions". One can "draw up" certain kinds of written documents, preeminently wills and
contracts (note Latin tract in this word), but not just any kind of written communication.
One cannot "draw up" a love letter or a sympathy note or an invitation. To be "drawn up"
a document must be a formal contractual type of statement.

One can "extract (note tract) from evidence at hand; formulate: 'draw
conclusions'". In the same sense one can put money in the bank and "withdraw it" or
"draw interest" from it. Technically speaking, money does not earn interest or make
interest, it draws interest.

"To draw the line" means "to set a limit, as of acceptable behavior", that is, to
induce tractable behavior by setting a game-like boundary.

When "draw" is used to refer to physically acting on an object directly, it seems to
have associations of violence. The definition "to eviscerate" is given in two different
places in the entry for "draw". Oddly enough, it also twice mentions instruments of
violence as examples of "draw": "To take or pull out, as from a scabbard or holster".
which can only mean a knife or sword, or a gun; and in another place "To pull out a weapon for use". Notice, "draw" does not mean the same as "take out"; one does not draw a gun to clean it. Because of this implication of violence, "to draw a gun" is ambiguous between "to make a picture of a gun" or "to prepare to shoot someone", where "to draw a flag" or "to draw an apple" are not, except where the violent implications of "draw" can be exploited for humor as in "He drew an apple on me", which implies that he did it in such a way as to make me thing he he was going to draw a gun.

In a similar sense, "to draw someone toward something" implies that it is not likely to be in the person's best interest, suggesting perhaps a trap. "To lead someone toward something" may be used in this sense, but does not necessarily imply that it is against his interest.

"To draw a bead on something" means to aim a gun at something as a target or mark which one intends to hit.

Finally, we can bring "draw" and "trace" together in the single expression "draw and quarter" which is defined thus:

1. To execute (a prisoner) by tying each limb to a horse and driving the horses in different directions. 2. To disembowel and dismember after hanging.

Recall that in one place quoted from the dictionary, tractare was defined as "to pull violently; discuss". This latter word, "discuss", is said by the dictionary to come from Latin dis-quater, "dis- apart + quater, to shake, strike", the root of which, according to the dictionary, is seen also in "cashier", "quash", "squash", "concuss", "percuss", and in the "quartered" of "drawn and quartered".

Thus, although "trace" and "draw" as modes of embodiment for a mark do not on the surface seem to involve violence, when one digs into the associations and underlying sense of the words, the underlying quality of force and violence can be seen to be manifest in the same semantic patterns in both words independently.

Moving on to other embodiments of the mark, the dictionary says that a mark can consist of a "notch in an animal's ear", not a natural notch, of course, but one that was put there in a distinctive unnatural form by cutting a certain number of times or in a certain pattern or in a certain place. A mark can be "a badge or brand adopted or imposed on a person." It is not clear what exactly a badge as a mark consists of in origin, though now it is considered to be something like a label, which we will discuss shortly. My dictionary just says the word "badge" was borrowed from Norman French.

A "brand" is defined as a

mark indicating identity or ownership burned into the hide of an animal with a hot iron...formerly burned into the flesh of criminals...Any mark of disgrace or notoriety; a stigma

A "brand" is also a "piece of burning or charred wood", i.e., wood marked by fire. The word "brand" comes from the Indo-European root *bhrew-, where it had reference to burning and cooking and related phenomena, such as boiling, bubbling, etc., and brewing or fermenting. In Proto-Germanic the word braudam meant "cooked food or leavened bread" becoming English "bread", bre:do:n meant "roast flesh" becoming the first part of German Bratwurst. So in general, the idea behind marking by branding is to burn or cook with fire.
And in nautical terms, a mark is a knot tied in a rope to mark distance or depth. A knot is a more or less permanent convoluted twist in a linear rope-like object, much as a symbol is an enigmatic twist in logic to mark distance or depth according to seconds.

The two remaining kinds of embodiment, a label and a name, will be discussed in a moment. Excluding those two terms, all of the kinds of physical embodiment of a mark which are listed in under that entry in the dictionary consist of some kind of physical damage or distortion of an object, or of severance of a part of an object, which is a more or less permanent material effect of an act of sufficient force to bring about that effect. It is this physical remnant of contact or conflict between the object and its environment which constitutes the mark of that object. The force can seemingly be of any kind, from the slightest touch of contact to considerable pressure, or pushing, or pulling, or twisting, or scratching, or cutting, or burning, or breaking, or killing. Or, cooking, which of course implies previous killing.

The "name" is the central mode of symbolic marking in language, primarily manifest in the physical medium of sound and secondarily in writing. It is a remarkable fact that in the definition of the word as given in the dictionary, there is not the slightest hint of force or negativity of any kind, in contrast to the consistent implication of force and violence which can be seen in all of the other modes of embodiment of a mark. And, it is also remarkable that the etymology of the word is unusually simple, uniform, and hence impenetrable: The root in Indo-European meant "name", and it means the same thing in Greek, Latin, and Germanic. There is virtually none of the normal complexity of formal or semantic variation. This seems very unusual to me, but the absence of complexity gives one nothing to investigate.

In any case, we do not need to rely on the dictionary or etymology to see the manifestation of force and violence in regard to the use of sound in language, because I demonstrated in Section 2.2 above that the subordination of the human expressive potential in the medium of sound to the representational function, in which the intrinsic value of sound is discarded so that sound can serve as the bearer of the marks of symbolic value, is a kind of colonization and domestication of sound, which is in itself a form of suppression and force, which constitutes the marking of sound. I will elaborate this claim from a different point of view below in Section 4.3. If my claim is correct, then the captivation of sound expression for the embodiment of marks is also a kind of force and distortion, in which case, the "name" as a kind of mark conforms to the general sense of the other modes of embodiment of marks.

The remaining medium of marking which the dictionary mentions is the "label". A label is described as consisting of "especially, a small piece of paper or cloth attached to an article", and also as an "epithet", which comes from Greek επιθέτον "an addition, something put on", and as "a molding over a door or window". A label seems to have the general sense of something extrinsic to the object being marked. Notice that a molding goes around and frames something, and suggests an association with the idea of a boundary.

Etymologically, the word "label" is said to come from Old French, where it meant "ribbon, strip". The same root is found in Latin labium, "lip" and is also the root of English "lip", which one might think brings us back directly to language via the phonetic role of the lips, or in the use of "lip" metonymically to refer to language. But those
associations do not help to explain how "lip" and "label" related to each other and to the concept of a mark?

There is a peculiarity in the etymology of this word which is almost exactly the same as the one we discussed above in the etymological relation between "mar" and "mark". "Lip" and labium are said to come from Indoeuropean leb-2. This latter root is listed as a separate entry from leb-1, though there appears to be no formal motivation whatever to do so. Also, in this case, unlike the instance above, the two roots are the same in Pokorny. The meaning given for leb-1 is "hanging loosely" which could easily include the idea of lips, e.g., "loose lips sink ships", "button your lip", etc. This root, leb-1, is the origin of Old English lappa, "flap of a garment", limphealt, "strike loose". It also came to mean "slobber" in various older Germanic languages. From the same root in Greek is lobos, meaning "lobe", i.e., something protruding, hence "earlobe". And "perhaps" in Latin labor, meaning "labor, toil, exertion", and borrowed into English as "labor", "elaborate", "collaborate". It is quite clear that the general sense of all of these words is that they refer to things which are marginal, in the sense of loosely attached, spilling out, or extraneous protuberances, and thus mark the boundaries of larger objects.

In the most common sense, "the lips" surround the opening of the mouth, but "lip" is used in general to refer to "any structure or part that similarly encircles or bounds an orifice" or even "the rim of a vessel, bell, crater, or the like". When we consider that "ribbon" comes through Dutch from the root ring- "to surround", and recall that a ribbon often goes around something, we see that the common idea underlying these words is something extrinsic to an object which is a sign of its margin or edge. Thus a "label" is a small piece, a cut off piece, of a boundary marker; it is extrinsic to the object which it marks; and it is loosely attached to the object which it marks.

Closely related to "label" in meaning is "tag", defined as

A strip of leather, paper, metal, or plastic attached to something or hung from a wearer's neck for the purpose of identification, classification, or labeling: a price tag.

Also defined as "a small loose fragment" such as a lock of hair or a snippet of conversation, some such small piece that is actually cut off from the body of something, or, being loosely attached, could easily be cut off, especially small characteristic elements at the end of an object, such as, "An ornamental flourish at the end of a signature" or "The refrain or last lines of a song or poem" or "The closing lines of a speech or play; a cue" or what is called "the tag" of a tag question in linguistics, such as

This is Tuesday, isn't it?

The latter part is a small, extraneous, loosely attached element which marks the boundary of the sentence and identifies it as a yes-no question.

It is interesting to note the definitions and examples given for "tag" as a verb.

1. To label, identify, or recognize with or as with a tag: I tagged him as a looser.
2. To put a ticket on (an automobile) for a traffic or parking violation. 3. To charge with a crime: He was tagged for murder.
The examples chosen suggest that "to tag" is not just to identify in any way at all, but to identify in some negative way as a looser or a violator or a murderer, reminiscent of the various uses of "mark" as a verb.

Given as a separate entry in the dictionary, though clearly the same idea, is "tag" as used in games. It mentions the "children's game in which one player pursues the others until he is able to touch one of them, who then becomes the pursuer". Of course, in some types of interaction, touching and the intrinsic sensory value of touching is the value that is being transacted, but in the symbolic type of game-like interaction, touching is a sign of something else. In this game, children do not refer to the pursuer by the name "pursuer", but rather as "it". One can speculate as to the drama that is being enacted in this game and the character that is being played by the child who is said to be "it", from whose very touch all of the others flee as if their lives depended on it.

The dictionary also gives the game use of "to tag" in touch football, where it means "to touch (the runner) as a substitute for tackling him". And, in baseball one touches the runner "to retire him". The runner is said then to be "out". Thus "to tag" in a game means to catch an opposing player and perform a token touch which brings his play to an end, at which point he retires from the game. It is the symbolic game counterpart of killing and such expressions as "to retire" and "to be out" are among the more genteel expressions used to describe this event in games. Very often, in describing the play of a game, the game value of tagging an opponent is more colorfully and explicitly expressed as "to stop him dead" or "to kill the play" or "the play is dead". In the converse, to say of a play in non-touch football that he "tagged the runner" means that he violently and abruptly stopped the opponent's progress. "To tag a deer" can mean "to attach a marking label to a deer" or it can mean "to kill a deer".

In summary, the use of the word "mark", as well as its synonyms, is pervaded with the aura of negativity, of undesirable qualities of all kinds including, error, ugliness, stupidity, destruction, violence, up to and including death by killing or murder. The mark must be embodied is some tangible physical phenomenon, which as we have seen, according to the dictionary, consists of either a separated part of the object to which the mark refers or a third extrinsic object which bears the mark as a result of some characteristic physical effect by the object on that third object. The mark must come into being as a mark through some physical force, which can vary from a slight pressure to a violent strike or stamp, pulling or dragging, scratching, cutting or burning, etc.

As we have stated the Law of Marks, the mark is a function of secondness. We have seen that the phenomenological type of being of secondness is brute physical substance, and the dynamic of secondness is brute physical force, and the orientation of secondness is that of radial opposition, and the character of secondness is division, from which it follows that the end of secondness is to establish its own independent boundary within which it can sustain its separateness. And, moreover, it wants to do so in such a way as to sustain its independence with the same solitude and security and peace and rest characteristic of the position of the first. The second wants to secure a release from the persistence and anxiety and tension of its struggle and to attain and sustain its independence. It wants to attain a symmetrical independence. But, at the level of
secondness, it is impossible to attain its goal, because it is impossible to escape from brute physical being and the laws of brute physical force by means of brute physical force. Except by death.

And, of course, death presupposes life, which presupposes birth. Therefore, birth and death are the brute physical boundaries of secondness, which consists, between those boundaries, of brute physical being.

But these boundaries are not set by secondness, and so they cannot be the separate boundaries desired by secondness. They are the natural and necessary and inescapable boundaries set by the law of being. The firstness of the boundaries of birth and death is reflected in the grammatical use and etymological underlying sense of the words in English, and presumably in other languages.

In grammar the expression of these phenomena require one-place verbs, most primitively: "those things happen". In the semantically fuller form of nouns, "birth happens" and "death happens". As verbs, there is no problem with, "he died", because the brute event of dying does not require the presence of anyone else, but logic and brute biological fact clash to cause problems for the symbolic representation of birth as a verb, so there is no such verb as "he birthed", "he borned", or "he bore". In English, we use the passive to avoid the problem, "he was born", leaving the agent unspecified, just as we said "the second is marked", because we cannot say "he bore himself" or "he was born by himself". There is the archaic, "she bore him", which sounds strange to our ears, but appears to have been grammatically acceptable, and might be taken to indicate that birth is sometimes a two-place predicate in language in correspondence with its biological nature.

Etymologically, "bore" and "born" and "birth" come from a root meaning "to carry", which can be seen in "bear", as "to bear a burden". Thus these words did not originally mean the same as a hypothetical "she birthed him", but were used to refer to birth metaphorically, "she carried him". Through the history of English, as a part of the overall drift process of changing from the complex system of verbal ablaut and elaborate suffixation to the less morphologically complex system we have now in English, the morphologically variant forms of the word "bear" which were used to describe birth metaphorically came to be unrecognized as variants of the same word, "bear" meaning "carry", and took on the exclusive derivative meaning of "birth". In short, they changed from metaphors of birth to be taken as literally meaning "birth". When these forms came to mean actual "birth" rather than the metaphorical "carry", it ceased to make logical sense to say "she bore him", and it ceased to be used.

In this way, and others, the structure of language reflects the underlying logical fact that birth and death are intrinsically phenomenological functions of being and not of doing. Thus birth and death cannot function as boundaries to express the secondness of the second. Those boundaries are presupposed in the nature of secondness.

One might say that secondness expresses its being by interrupting firstness, beginning with birth and ending with death, conceding to firstness what is before and after, if anything. But actually, firstness is not only before and after, but it is also underlying and sustaining the being of secondness, and so, continues uninterrupted, (literally, "not broken between") and entirely contains and sustains secondness. The phenomenal essence of brute events is established on the priority of being. Something
must be, before anything can happen. Thus, even in brute fact, secondness does not manage to perturb the surface of firstness.

This relationship is mirrored in language: sound can be said to interrupt the prior and subsequent silence, though in brute fact, sound consists of a mixture of acoustic force and silence. Physical analysis of physical sound reveals that what is perceived as sound consists of energy interspersed with silence. There is no such thing as pure sound which is unmixed with silence. The poet-philosopher Max Picard has voiced some fruitful observations on the relationship between sound and silence. First, in regard to the relation of priority.

Silence can exist without speech, but speech cannot exist without silence. (p. 13)

the silence that precedes speech is the pregnant mother (p. 8)

language has arisen out of silence. The world of language is built over and above the world of silence. (p. 22)

Man lives between the world of silence from which he comes and the world of the other silence to which he goes - the world of death. Human language also lives between these two worlds of silence and is upheld by them. That is why language has a double echo: from the place whence it came and from the place of death.

Language receives innocence, simplicity, and originality from the silence from whence it came, but its short duration, its fragility, and the fact that language never entirely corresponds to the things it is describing, come from the second silence, from death. (p. 25)

Thus, first is to second, as being is to happen, as silence is to sound, as birth is to death. And, of course, they are asymmetrical. Birth is the boundary from the firstness to secondness and death is boundary from secondness to firstness. Therefore, birth is the manifestation of firstness in the physical medium of secondness, the boundary from firstness to secondness, and the iconic sign of firstness in the physical embodiment of the second. Death is the manifestation of secondness, the end of secondness, and the indexical mark of secondness. Birth iconically mirrors unity and death indexically marks division.

But these primitive brute boundary markers are still a function of firstness. They are manifest in secondness, but they are not an expression of secondness. It is not that the second separates itself by means of these natural marks, but rather that it obeys them, and in obeying them conveys its submission to firstness. Therefore, in so far as birth and death are a function of being, they cannot function as boundaries of the separateness of secondness.

It is in the nature of secondness that it seeks to establish its own separate boundaries of identity and boundary marks of identity. But, as we have seen, it cannot do so in the logic of firstness or secondness, hence the necessity to cut out a third element in which to embody the boundary and through which to develop the logic of thirdness. It is the willful intentional death of the third, or a sign of its death, which is the characteristic mark of thirdness.

There is an important asymmetry between birth and death in the fact that birth, as a manifestation of firstness, cannot be tactically apprehended by man and cannot be manipulated or reproduced at will, whereas death, as a manifestation of secondness, can be produced more or less at will. For this reason, sexual relations and sexual organs and
the whole process of reproduction cannot be conveniently apprehended for symbolic purposes and tend to be socially devalued, denied, repressed, covered literally and figuratively, and even prohibited in various ways and to various degrees.

By contrast, death is a public commodity. The natural means of sustaining the brute being and force of life entails the death and consumption of other living being, which we then call sustenance. The death of the other sustains the life of the killer and eater, and thus establishes a hierarchy of death and priority in terms of sustenance within the realm of brute being which is an iconic enactment of the mastery of death and, if not of birth, at least of the sustenance of life. Death and food becomes the medium in which power and control are most primitively expressed. It provides the analogical model in terms of which the second, the other, can apprehend and use another other, a third, as an instrument for the enactment of his mastery of death and life, the mark and substance of secondness through killing and consumption of the third. Killing for the purpose of sustaining life is not an expression of the independence of secondness, but killing in order to represent mastery of death is the logically primitive essence of the mark of secondness and the dead victim is the embodiment of that intent, the primitive indexical sign of intent to be the master of death, the second one. This is what is known as the mark of Cain. Thus death is the thrust of the mark, but this is not yet a symbolic mark, because the relation between the sign and its referent is still governed by the physical relation in physical law. To be symbolic the relation must be one of conventional law.

Let us consider the sign function of birth, the other fundamental boundary. Birth is also taken as a sign and incorporated into social convention, but it is not technically a symbol either, and never gets to be one. As I mentioned above, birth is a sign of unity, where death is a sign of division. The most fundamental social counterpart of the original unity of firstness is the synthetic unity enacted in the contractual relation of marriage. We say that the two become one, and are regarded as one in many ways. For example, a person cannot be compelled to testify against himself in proceedings of law, and a spouse also cannot be compelled to testify against the other, as if they were one person.

In our society, people tend to think that the relation of marriage is established in the form of a contract manifest in written and/or spoken words. To some extent this is true, but in law it does or may involve certain tangible acts which are quite independent of the written or spoken contract. For example, in some states, the contractual relation of marriage can be enacted merely by the two parties living together, representing themselves as being married. On the other hand, if the relationship is not sexually consummated, the contract of marriage may be annulled, as distinct from divorce. Annulment means that there never was really a marriage at all. The priority of consummation implies that the essence of the marital relation is not in the written or spoken words, but in the conjugal act. This implies in turn that, since the primitive representation of social unity is in marriage, that the enactment of that unity is essentially in the conjugal act, which of course is the first step in the process leading to birth. This implies that a person is not a full-fledged social unit until they have physically participated in the process leading to birth.

Many societies go a great deal farther than that, as ours did in the past. In most societies a marriage is not considered to be solidified until there has been a child. Birth is the fulfillment of the biological function of marriage, and the coming forth of the third member of the relationship is the most tangible and incontrovertible manifestation of
unity. The child is taken as the fruit and embodiment of the marriage as a social entity. It is the seal of the contract. And, what is more, in most societies, a marriage which has no such proof is considered to be incomplete or abnormal in some sense. And, in many ways individuals who are not married and/or do not have children are considered to be somewhat less than fully legitimate members of society.

In Bali, to choose one example, though similar practices are very common, according to Geertz (1973, p. 376-377), in husband and wife coming to be identified as a pair "it is not the act of marriage which brings about the identification but of procreation". And, in the system of naming, every member of the society has one kind of name given to them as a child, but when they become parents, they are called "father of so and so" or "mother of so and so". Thus, if someone does not have a child, he or she will retain a child-name and be known by that name as a childless and childish person throughout the rest of their life. Not only that, but the status of father or mother, as distinct from husband or wife, "has very great economic, political, and spiritual importance" as a condition of membership in the hamlet council, descent groups, irrigation societies, etc.

It can be seen that birth, and the fundamental relationship of social unity which it mediates, plays an integral social function, but it never attains the status of a symbol, because it resists direct apprehension and manipulation. One cannot see the essential processes which culminate in birth, but birth is the emergence into the perceptible realm of brute fact of those processes. They are hidden by their nature, especially in comparison to the processes leading to death. Whereas, death happens in many ways, and it can be made to happen in many ways, and it can be manipulated in many ways, there is only one way to bring about birth. It cannot be done by hand, nor manufactured, nor manipulated, nor even imitated very realistically.

Nevertheless, birth plays a pivotal role in the development of the idea of the symbol. Where physical death is the prototype of the mark of division, birth is the prototype of union. The word "symbol" etymologically means "throw together", the idea being that the physical union manifest in birth is reenacted in the symbolic contractual reunification of meaning and form as manifest in the mark, where meaning is the counterpart of firstness, form the counterpart of secondness, and the mark is the third.

A sign has two aspects: Its substance and its value. Peirce speaks of the value aspect of a sign as its referent or its meaning, but those are not primitive concepts, and are misleadingly tainted with presuppositions of thirdness, so they are not the best place to begin to understand the place and sense of value in signs. In order to clarify these two aspects of the sign and their relationship to each other we must look at them typologically.

At the level of firstness, if we consider an object as itself, in accord with its intrinsic nature, without evaluating it in relation to an extrinsic standard, or any other external relation, the substance of a thing is its value. There is no division between substance and value. In view of this fact, it does not make grammatical sense at the level of firstness to speak of "substance" in the literal sense of "that which stands under".

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35 I am aware that scientists can see and manipulate some phases of the process, but what is called "artificial insemination" is not very artificial. When they can make ova and sperm from chemicals, then it would be proper to call it "artificial".
because there are not two phenomena, substance and value, in a layered relation of underness and overness. This kind of phenomenological layering with which we are so familiar and which motivates us to speak of "substance" and "understanding" is itself a typological function of signs in a way which we will shortly examine.

In that substance and value are not two things in the phenomenology of firstness, it would be grammatically correct to say that the value of an object is what it is. While this manner of speaking is correct in grammar, to speak of value independently of being implies that they are two things, when actually they are one thing: its value is its being. Thus, the simplest and clearest way to characterize the substance and value of an object at the level of firstness is to say that it is what it is, or better yet, it is.

As we have seen, the phenomenological type of pure firstness is not physically apprehensible, and thus can play no overt and direct role in the tangible embodiment of signs. The being and substance of a sign cannot consist of the being of firstness, because a sign which was not physically manifest, could not function as a sign.

As we also saw in Section 2.1, this property of firstness does not mean that the being of firstness does not have tangible consequences or that it is an intrinsically mystical and incomprehensible order of being. It just means that you cannot apprehend, comprehend, assert, and transact in it directly by means of tangible physical instruments of manipulation, that is signs, because signs already presuppose and are established on the foundation of the value of the being of firstness. Therefore, whereas the substance of a sign cannot consist of firstness, the value of a sign does consist of firstness, by virtue of the fact that value is rooted in being.

This implies that all value, no matter how far removed or how refined it may be, no matter how alienated or arbitrary it might seem, has its roots in firstness. This includes the kind of value which we normally speak of in language, that is, meaning and reference. It also includes the value of money, for if there was a currency which could not be exchanged for objects whose value was directly rooted in being, such as food, it would be worthless.

It is precisely because meaning in the linguistic sense is so close to the roots of being that it is not directly perceivable, and it is for this reason that is considered to be unimportant and dispensable from the point of view of the hard sciences, which looks at brute facts from the symbolic point of view. But, of course, all linguists in practice, as well as hard scientists themselves, rely on meaning in their use of language, and through the profound influence of language, in all transactions which are more than sheerly brute behavior. Meaning, or more broadly, value, is ultimately the same as being.

When we speak of uniting form and meaning in the symbol, which is embodied in the physical being of the mark, it is important to realize that even though the embodiment of the symbol is mere brute being of physical substance, such substance still has the intrinsic value of its being. There are two kinds of value here: the symbolic value, which is usually spoken of as meaning or reference, and the intrinsic value of the physical embodiment of the symbol.

It follows from the asymmetry of types that, although one can take a physical object as a sign, one does not necessarily have to do so. It is easy to see this asymmetry of value in objects regarded as food. I am not claiming that the value of an object as food is its most primitive value in being, but that from the point of view of human being, it is one of the most primitive physical values, biologically and ontogenetically, and one can
see the asymmetry of value clearly in terms of that primitive human standard. In so far as eating is concerned, the substance of an apple, for example, is its value. An apple is food because of its intrinsic substance. But, it does not come to have that value because I want to eat it or because I take it as an apple. On the contrary, I want to eat it because it already has that value. Thus, this type of value, the intrinsic value of being, even when manifest physically, is prior to any relation, prior to any transaction, and prior to any possible sign function which might be imposed on an object.

But, as we know, the priority of the intrinsic value of being does not prevent human beings from taking absolutely any object as a sign of something else. I could take an apple as a sign of temptation, or as a token of good health, or as 50 cents, etc., but whatever I take it as, the apple is still an apple, with the intrinsic value of an apple. We would say that a particular apple is and apple, but that in its sign function it stands for or represents temptation, or health, or 50 cents. Note that we cannot say that an apple which functions as a sign in such a way is a mark.

Taking an object as a sign does not in itself necessarily have any physical effect at all on the object or its intrinsic value, so long as the object functions as an iconic sign only. But even in the purely iconic sign function, the sign value is, strictly speaking, imposed on the object which embodies the sign. Peirce gives the example of taking a donkey as a zebra: one could

> suumise that zebras are likely to be obstinate, or otherwise disagreeable animals, because they seem to have a general resemblance to donkeys, and donkeys are self-willed. (2.281)

In so taking an apple as a sign of temptation or a donkey as a sign of a zebra, the intrinsic being and value of the apple or the donkey has not been affected in any way. Nothing has happened to the apple or the donkey. Whatever has happened in brute fact when it was taken as a sign of something, went on in the mind of the observer.

Nevertheless, a separation has been effected, if only in the mind of the observer. To the extent that the object is valued as a sign of something else, the object is perceived as having that value and its intrinsic value is correspondingly discounted. To take an object as a sign is to impose an alien value upon that object. Thus the iconic sign initiates the first step in the layering of substance and value, which I mentioned above. This is first point in the evolution of signs that we can speak of a split between substance and value, even though nothing perceivable has happened. And, it is at this point that the use of "reference" makes sense in speaking of value. Because of the fact that the sign value of an object is alien to the nature of the object, there is no objective intrinsic natural relation to that value; as a sign it can only be related to that extrinsic value by reference.

An object qua object has a value, but an object qua sign refers to a value.

This split between the substance of the object and its sign value has no necessary effect on the object, and it may have no subsequent effect on the object at all. But, if the object is in the hands of the person who takes it as a sign, the fate of the object depends on whether that person transacts with it in accord with its intrinsic value or with its sign value. For example, a crooked tree may be taken as a sign of evil and cut down.

In summary of what we have said so far, first, the substance of all signs consists of physical embodiment, which is to say that the substance of all signs is in the type of

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36 I am excluding the possibility of a microscopic examination of the brain or whatever organ one might consider to be the locus of a possible microscopic brute happening during the course of the event under consideration.
secondness. Second, in regard to value, as a physical object a sign has an intrinsic value, but when that object is taken as an iconic sign, a split in value is effected in the mind of the observer between the intrinsic value of the embodiment of the sign and the extrinsic value imposed on that embodiment. The object as a sign is said to refer to the extrinsic value. It is at this point that it makes sense to speak of substance in the literal sense. Third, in the type of iconic signs, this split between substance and value need not necessarily have any consequences for the substance of the sign, but it may, if the sign is apprehended for use in transactions in terms of the extrinsic value imposed on it.

When we come to the second type of sign, the index, the last condition no longer holds. Recall that an index is a sign that refers by means of some physical relation between the physical embodiment of the sign and the referent. For example, smoke is an indexical sign of fire. A burned piece of wood is an indexical sign of fire. A nail hole is an index of a nail. Thunder is an index of rain. A footprint of a deer is an indexical sign of a deer. A scar is an indexical sign of a cut. Blood is an indexical sign of life. A dead body is an indexical sign of death.

Note that all of these are natural signs in the sense that the physical relation between the sign and its referent is a natural relation. But some of them are not natural in the sense that they were or could have been instigated by man. All of these examples could be artificial man-made phenomena. A fire may be natural or it could be man-made, though the smoke and burning of the fire are natural. A nail hole could only be man made, though the hole is a natural consequence of using a nail. Thunder could be the result of a man-made explosion or sonic boom, but the power which is heard as thunder must be real physical power. A footprint could be faked, though it must be a real physical impression. A cut which draws blood could be an accident or intentional, but the appearance of blood and the consequent scar are natural results of a cut. And a death could be natural or intentional, but the result of death is a natural consequence of natural cause.

Peirce says that

Anything which focuses the attention is an index. Anything which startles us is an index, in so far as it marks the junction between two portions of experience.

Probably the simplest kind of mark is a landmark. The function of a landmark is to provide a point of reference in relation to which one can orient himself in physical space for the purpose of finding some place out of sight. The object which functions as a landmark must be a relatively small and discrete physical object which stands out by contrast with the surrounding continuity. For example, it could be a sharp elevation or indentation in an otherwise flat area. Or, it could be a flat area in an otherwise sloping area. It could be a tree in a treeless plain, or a small clearing in a densely forested area. It could be one tree that is taller than all of the others. It could be a crooked tree among straight ones, or vice versa. Whatever it is, it must be a discontinuity on which one can focus attention. Notice that in becoming a landmark, nothing happens to the object necessarily. One can say, "mark that tall tree", meaning to mark it in memory, but it does not mean that you should put a cut in the tree. And for this reason, in this sense of mark, we do not say the tree is marked. And, we would not say that the route is marked by that tree. It is not the tree or the route that is marked, but the mind of the observer. The tree is simply singled out for attention and remembered as a point of reference.

In this sense, Roger Brown (1965, p. 318) correctly observes that
Flowers are marked by sniffing actions...

Since nothing happens to the flower, in the same sense as nothing happens to the tree, it is only a metaphorical manner of speaking to say that they are marked. It is really the mind of the observer which is marked by the impression of the image of the object. This kind of mark is actually the logical type which Peirce called a "degenerate third". It is only when there is a tangible physical mark perceptibly manifest in an independent third object that we can speak of a mark in the sense in which it is used in language.

In the function of the landmark, the role of the first is a place where one wants to get to, such as home, let us say. That place is out of sight, but is in some physical spatial relation to the tree, or whatever it is, such that the second party, the one who is lost, can find his way by means of the intermediary location of the tree. The tree, then, marks the juncture between where one is and where one wants to be. In this case, the function of the tree as a mark is coincidental to the nature of the tree itself. And it can only perform this function as a result of previous experience in learning the relation between the tree and the goal. There is nothing natural in the character of the tree or the place that constitutes it as a mark. Thus, we should say that the tree functions as a mark, not that it is a mark.

Of course it is possible to construct a tall tower or building in a particular location to serve as a point of reference. For example, a lighthouse or buoys are placed at especially dangerous or important reference points to mark the boundaries of the sea. Such man-made landmarks are marks properly speaking. One says that a rock or shipping lane is marked and that such a man-made object is a mark.

A more primitive kind of mark is to scratch or hack a mark on a tree to mark a route. Or one could put several (at least three) rocks in a straight line to mark a route. But if there are many scratches or many rocks, such a mark would be more likely to fail in its purpose. To be a mark, it must be in sharp contrast to the surroundings, which is to say that it must be an unnatural physical embodiment of intent.
5.2 THE STRUCTURE OF LANGUAGE

Taking the opposition one/many as our prototype of the logic of secondness, which we have represented as the relation of radial opposition, let us apply this prototype abductively to the closely related opposition true/false. The idea is, in other words, that there is an analogical relation between these two oppositions such that true is prior to false, just as one is prior to many.

When we take up the question of truth in language it brings us at once against the barrier of a commonly held presupposition about both truth and the basic function of language. Concerning the function of language, it is commonly taken as a premise in our society these days that language is primarily an instrument of and vehicle for the communication of information. It would follow from this premise, and is commonly held to be so, that the structure and use of language is a function of information. While this may be true to some extent, the role of language as an instrument of information is a subordinate one. Information, in the technical sense, can only be conceptualized in the logic of thirdness, and therefore whatever the determinative effect of information is on the nature of language, it is subordinated to that of secondness and firstness.

Concerning the position of truth in relation to language, in keeping with the assumption of the importance of information, it is also commonly assumed that truth is something which language can be used to refer to, but which is in another realm from that of language, if not actually something which is invented by language. I am claiming that this premise is also one that is reasonable only from the point of view of thirdness, for when one looks at the matter from the point of view of secondness, it becomes clear that transactions of secondness are played out precisely in the dimension of truth as opposed to that of information. In other words, the logic of secondness is a play upon or a playing with truth. This can be seen by the hard fact character of secondness: winning and losing in tactical transactions is not a matter of opinion or information. In tactical interplay, correctness wins and incorrectness loses, and the ultimate loss is death, which is not a matter of information or opinion either. The relation between truth and information can be summed up by observing that information is a function of difference, whereas truth is a function of sameness.

That this is the case, and the implications of this fact, may not be clear at this point, but it is necessary for me to make it explicit that it is this contrary premise upon which I am proceeding to pursue the investigation of the properties of the opposition between true and false. I believe it will become somewhat more clear and credible as we progress through the discussion.

What I want to show here is that the true is first. One might suppose that it could be taken as self-evident that the true is prior to the false, but the quote cited at the end of Section 3 by Kenneth Burke explicitly asserted that the false is first. I assume this view is not his alone, and therefore should be addressed.

One can argue that the true is to the false as one is to many. In several ways, one can see the manyness of the false. For example, if today is Tuesday, then "Today is

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Tuesday" is true, but "Today is Wednesday" and the other five possible sentences which name the days of the week are false. The same is true in general: for each true statement there are many possible false statements.

We can see the manyness of the false in another way. If I am hungry and want to get something to eat, and if I ask someone where I can get something to eat, and he tells me a lie, saying, for example, "Go two blocks that way and turn left and go two more blocks", and if I go there an find that there is no food there, then I must ask again. When someone finally tells me the truth and I go there and eat, the matter is finished. Thus, truth leads to satisfaction, where the false necessitates repetition. The use of the concept of satisfaction as the consequence of truth is common in logical terminology. The truth satisfies. But, it is seldom noticed, that the false must then dissatisfy, and necessitate repetition.

We can see the manyness of the false in yet another way. Suppose Bill invites me to eat dinner with him, and I do not want to. I might lie to him saying, "I would like to, but I have a meeting with Bob". Now, suppose he had already asked Bob and Bob said he would go eat with him because he had nothing to do. And suppose Bill tells me that Bob said he had nothing to do. Then what do I say. I might lie again to protect the first lie, saying, "Oh! Did I say Bob? I meant to say Jim". And so on. At any point the truth will bring the cycle to an end, but each lie closes itself off from the truth and is inherently exposed to disclosure and thus to repetition and multiplication.

In these and other ways which we will encounter below, it can be seen that the relation between true and false is characterized by its nature as than of oneness vs. manyness, and thus true is prior and false subsequent.

Also, we saw in a quote above by Greenberg that logicians implicitly recognize the priority of truth when they speak of "truth value" as the category of opposition rather than "falsity value". Truth is the standard by which the false is false.

In ordinary language, speaking is presupposed to be true. An unembellished proposition has the presupposed force of truth. Thus, if I say

# Bob is at work

I will be taken as having asserted that this proposition is true. And if I am to be held strictly accountable for knowing what I say, I will be taken as having lied, if he is not in fact at work. On the other hand, if I know that he is not at work, but rather is fishing, and I want to deceive, I will say exactly the same thing.

# Bob is at work

The act of lying is more complex, because in lying I must have two propositions on the table: Bob is a work" and "Bob is fishing". However, the form of the false is identical with, in fact, it imitates the form of the true, just as we saw earlier, the form of "blinking at" imitates the form of the pure blink. The false represents itself and puts itself forward as the true. There is no special structure for the false; It clothes itself in the form given by the true, and is thus dependent upon the priority of and presupposes knowledge of the true. This fact is stated nicely by Jacques Lacan in the following words.
the sign, just of itself, can only present and sustain itself in the dimension of the truth. Because, in order to deceive, speech affirms itself as true....In fact, as the lie is organized, pushes out its tentacles, it requires the correlative control of the truth it encounters at every twist and turn of the way, and which it must avoid. (p 263)

What this means in essence is that you must know the truth in order to be able to lie. If you do not know the truth, then perhaps you are just mistaken, but you cannot possibly lie.

Because of the formal dependence of the false upon the true, there is a general asymmetry such that the form of the true refers to the true and the form of the false also refers to the true. For example, one day I went into the kitchen and found my three year old son standing and he said,

I didn't take any cookies

from which I was able to ascertain that either he did take some cookies or he had thought about doing so. In general, if you know that someone is lying, you can ascertain the direction of the truth.

Going back to the question of where Bob is, if we suppose that I do not know for sure where he is, and if I believe that I will be held accountable for my words, I should not simply make the bald assertion that he is at work, but must properly qualify the assertion by adding something to it such as the following.

I think Bob is at work
Jim said Bob is at work
Bob is probably at work
Bob should be at work

Any structure which I add to the naked proposition will have the effect of deflecting the presupposed force of truthfulness of the assertion in one direction or another away from that of truth. My interlocutor would conclude correctly from any of these more complex assertions that it might not be true that Bob is at work. Taking these examples of added structure, and the many others which are available in the grammar of English, as marks, it can be seen that any mark added to the simplest grammatically permissible form of assertion deflects the force of the assertion away from the central beginning point, which is truth.

What really puts the icing on this argument is that if one tries to enhance the force of the truthfulness of an assertion by adding forms which semantically convey the intention of truth such as the following

I am sure Bob is at work
I know Bob is at work
It is true that Bob is at work
such semantic assertions of truth do not have the desired force. Unless there had been some elaborate prior context which had already placed one's assertion in doubt, such attempts only defeat their purpose and cast one's motives in doubt. The more one tries to increase the force of the truthfulness of the assertion by adding structure, even structure which affirms the truth, it has the contrary effect of deflecting its force away from that of truth, as can be seen clearly in an exaggerated example such as this.

I am being perfectly honest when I tell you that Bob is at work. I am telling you the truth. I wouldn't lie to you.

Such examples prove that when there is a conflict between the semantic force and the force of the law of markedness, the latter has priority. The sheer fact of additional structure, of added marks, has the overriding effect of mitigating the force of truth.

In terms of our geometric image of radial opposition, one can explain this by saying that language radiates outward from the presupposed central point, which is truth. The structure of language revolves about that central point as its point of reference and standard of measure. In such a geometric figure, it is not possible to get more central than the center. Or, in simple minded gravitational terms, one could say that from the ground there are degrees of being up and of building structure up, but one is either on the ground or not. There can be degrees of falsehood, but not degrees of truth. Thus, every mark is a mark of secondness in one direction or another radiating outward from the original point of reference, which is the true. This is another sense in which the true is one and the false many. And, correspondingly in the dimension of form, for any set of structurally related forms, there is one which is central, given as a minimal unity according to the rules of the grammar, and many which are derived from it by adding one or more marks.

In syntax, the simple declarative form of a sentence has been taken by generative grammar as the basic form from which all others are derived, and in doing so all derived forms are marked. Thus, from the first sentence given below, all of the others are derived by transformation and marked as derived.

Bob hit Bill

Bob was hit by Bill
It was Bob that hit Bill
It was Bill that Bob hit
Bill was who Bob hit
Bob was who hit Bill
Did Bob hit Bill?
Was Bill hit by Bob?
Bob hit Bill, didn't he
Who hit Bill?

etc.

The lexicon is structured in the same way. Jakobson points out that
Star means either a celestial body or a person - both of preeminent brightness. A hierarchy of two meanings - one primary, central, proper, context-free; and the other secondary, marginal, figurative, transferred, contextual - is a characteristic feature of such asymmetrical couples. (1971, 355)

Notice that he calls this structure a "hierarchy". As was discussed in Section x, it is not technically a hierarchical relationship, because the two meanings are not of the same type.

Lakoff (1987, especially Chapter 6) has an extensive discussion of what he calls "radial categories" in the lexical structure of language. He uses the same geometrical concept of "radial" structure as was developed here, by which it is clear that he intuitively recognizes the validity of such oppositions, but he does not characterize them as oppositions, nor does he exploit the implication that "radial" structures imply "diametrical" ones. The theoretical position of his concept of radial categories is that of an inductively motivated hypothesis, being borrowed from psychological studies of prototype theory. Here I have derived it deductively from typological logic and grounded it in an independently motivated theory of logic. His concept, however, is in effect the same as radial opposition, the orientation of secondness.

A radial structure is one where there is a central case and conventionalized variations on it... (p. 84)

He gives many examples, one of the simplest is kinds of mothers such as "adoptive mother", "stepmother", "surrogate mother", etc. noting that "these subcategories of mother are all understood as deviations from the central case", but he does not note that they are formally marked as deviations in the added word: a mother is a mother, but a stepmother is not. He discusses the radial structure of color terms, kin terms, and many others.

Greenberg (1966b) demonstrated the radial markedness structure of systems of kin terms. As measured conceptually by steps of relationship from ego as a point of reference.

it is the more remote from the speaker which is always marked in relation to the less remote. (p. 73)

In lineal vs. collateral, the latter is marked, and in consanguineal vs. affinal, the latter is marked. And, "ascending generations are unmarked as against descending generations" (p. 76), that is, for example, the terms for older siblings are unmarked in relation to the terms for younger siblings.

In all such systems there is one central term which functions as the point of reference from which all the others derive and are marked according to conceptual distance from that point of reference. Thus, the central term is always one in relation to the derived terms, which are many.

The structure of radial opposition can be seen clearly also in the basic deictic markers in language. "Here" is where I am speaking from, whether I say the word or not. "Here" is one, and "there" is many. We normally say "here and there", not "there and here". So too with

now and then
this and that
me and him
us and them

The effect of radial opposition can be seen in the following. In the absence of prior context we say

the truth and a lie

where truth is first and where the use of the definite determiner indicates that it is presupposed that the referent of the noun is one particular object and that it is known to both the speaker and hearer, and the use of the indefinite determiner presupposes that the object is only one of many and is not know by the hearer.

The presupposition that manyness is associated with the false can be seen to be interwoven into the semantics of a wide variety of idioms and morphologically complex words which mean falseness, such as

duplicity
two-faced
forked-tongued
double dealer

and it is interesting to note that there are no corresponding expressions in English for the truth, such as

* aplicity
* one-faced
* unforked-tongue
* single dealer

This asymmetry also correlates with the fact that there is no counterpart of the verb "to lie", such as "* to truth", because for the latter one need only use the verb "to say", as in

Bob said that today is Monday

which means that Bob asserted that it was true. These examples illustrate a point I made in discussing the general form of the law of markedness above: It is often the case that the vocabulary of language is structured asymmetrically according to the law of markedness such that there are entries for the second, with no corresponding form at all for the first.

The manifestation of the general law of markedness in relation to the true can also be seen in the foundation of form in language, which is primarily that of sound. Up to this point I have taken for granted that a mark consists of the addition of more sound, which is true up to a point, but it is not that simple. The concept of a mark is complicated by the fact that we must take into consideration the distinction between sound as a material phenomenon and the conceptual counterpart of sound, which is the phoneme. And in addition, it is well known that these material phenomena differ in complexity and the phonemes which they represent differ in markedness. For example, the phoneme /a/
is unmarked in relation to /i/ and the phoneme /k/ is marked in relation to the phoneme /t/, and so on. The markedness structure of phonology has been extensively investigated, probably most thoroughly and coherently in Roman Jakobson's many works on the subject, and if one is familiar with his work, it is relatively easy to see how the markedness structure of phonology can be subsumed under the law which I am proposing here.

I would like to leave aside the complex internal stratification of phonological systems in order to focus attention on the most primitive foundation of form in language, which is the opposition between sound and silence. Given that the scope of analysis here is dictated by our interest in language, the class of phenomena which are included does not coincide with that of physics. It is sound produced by vocalization which is within our focus, and the opposing silence is that which results by default when vocalization is not being produced. Thus in so far as language is concerned, if not in general, silence is prior to sound, as well as after sound. Therefore, the production of sound by means of vocalization is the most primitive level of form in language, hence sound is in itself the most primitive mark.

When we put the fundamental semantic fact that truth is first together with the fundamental formal fact that silence is first, we come up with the correlation of silence with the true and sound with the false. No doubt this is the meaning of the saying,

Good speech is silver, but silence is gold

as well as many others in a similar vein in English, and in many other languages. Another example from another language and culture, one which asserts the precise point I am trying to prove here, is found in the Diamond Sutra (Conze, p. 28).

Wherever there is a possession of marks, there is fraud, wherever there is no-possession of no-marks there is no fraud. Hence the Tathagata is to be seen from no-marks as marks.

"Tathagata" here means "thus-ness" or "what is so", or in other words, truth. Thus the primitive value of sound, taken in its most general sense, as the radial opposite of silence, is as a token of the false. This is so, as we discussed in Section 2.1, because the first, being presupposed, is unrepresentable.

We can arrive at the same conclusion by another route. Among the intrinsic properties of truth is that it is self-evident and consistent with itself. It does not contradict itself, which means, literally, that it does not speak against itself. Rather, it agrees with itself. On the other hand, the false is most forcefully revealed as the false by its internal contradiction and by its contradiction to the true. Therefore, agreement and consistency are properties of the true, as opposed to disagreement and inconsistency, which are properties of the false.

Now, it is a widely recognized fact that silence has the force of agreement. Even in law, the force of agreement in silence is sufficient to constitute the acceptance of a legally binding contract. Also, in trial court, silence on the part of an attorney during the course of a trial is taken as an unappealable acceptance of anything which happens. Only

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38 Note, by the way, that the asymmetric markedness of these two terms, "dis-agreement" and "in-consistency", is predicted by the law of markedness to be associated with the false.
by voicing an objection can an attorney get the court to recognize a legal lack of acceptance.

In principle, since truth is what is so, one should agree with what is true, thus in principle silence is a sign of the true, and vocalization a mark of the false. Of course, people do not always agree with the true, but that is merely a fact about what people do, and has no necessary relation to the nature of things. Human beings are infamous for their proclivity for transacting in the false.

Or, consider another kind of example. Recall the situation I described above where I am hungry and looking for something to eat. When I have found food, there is no longer any reason to speak. When I am satisfied and content, the natural thing to do is to remain silent. But, the false results in dissatisfaction and necessitates repetition. Dissatisfaction, discontent, disagreement, inconsistency, all induce continued vocalization; and consistency, agreement, satisfaction, contentedness, all lead to silence. The false perpetuates the question, whereas the true answers it. Vocalization, in its most primitive value, is thus a sign of the false, and silence a sign of the true.

Physically speaking, sound is produced by two forces in conflict which produces a turbulence in the air, and thus in its nature sound is a by-product of conflict. Purely natural sound is produced by such things as the turbulence of the wind striking against an object or by branches of a tree striking together or by the waves striking against the shore. In human vocalization, the sound is produced by the conflict between the air that is pushed out from the lungs and the partially closed vocal chords through which it has to force its way. The turbulence is produced by the intermittent opening and closing of the vocal chords as they yield to reduce the pressure, then having reduced it, close up once again. The state of the vocal apparatus during the process of vocalization is very different from the state during either relaxed breathing or complete closure. It is in an intermediate state of approximated closure, held in that position by tension of the musculature of the glottis. The sound of language is produced by a conflict between the muscular effort striving to expel air and the muscular effort of holding the vocal chords in approximated closure. It is a product of a tension of internal conflict and thus conveys iconically the value of tension and conflict, which are characteristic of the false, and thus sound functions as a mark of the false.

From this point, having established the pattern of relationship between the elements in radical opposition and the isomorphic correlation between pairs of oppositions, we can expand the scope of our investigation in any direction. It is easy now to add the opposition between good and bad, because it clearly falls in with the patterns we have established: good is first and is one as opposed to bad which is second and many. The entire text of the Bible is an elaborate fabric woven from the correlation between the primitive opposition which we have before us: one vs. many, true vs. false, silence vs. sound, and good vs. evil. From the beginning to the end the text is made up of thousands of language structures large and small which only make sense in terms of the principle of radial opposition and the correlation among specific opposites on the same pattern. For example, there is the persistent global theme that God is true, good, and one, whereas the devil is false, evil and many. At the level of particulars, the word "devil" was borrowed into English from Greek diabolos which means literally "to draw or pull across" and implies division. The equivalent in English might be "the divider".
As another example, we might mention the infamously incomprehensible statement (Genesis 27:11),

Esau, my brother, is a hairy man, and I am a smooth man

which comes to make sense as meaning that Esau is false, evil, and many, if it is viewed through the matrix of primitive values which I am trying to demonstrate here: smooth vs. hairy is one vs. many is good vs. bad. In the Bible, as well as in language in general, images of manyness primitively refer to the same value. This includes the divided, the scattered, and the hairy. In ordinary English we have the expression, "a hairy problem", which means that it is an entangled problem, one which is buried under many false leads.

The Biblical images of manyness also includes elaborate plays on the unsettled, the conflicted, the turbulent, the fast moving. For example, in James (1:6 and 1:8) it says

he that wavereth is like a wave of the sea driven with the wind and tossed...A double-minded man is unstable in all his ways

the image opposite to these, that is, in the position of the first in terms of radial opposition, would be complete absence of movement, which image is invoked throughout the text, an example of which we can see a little further on in James (1:17), where it speaks of God

with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning

Another theme to be found threading its way through the text of the Bible is the peculiar-seeming status of the name of the absolute first position in this system of oppositions, the true, the good, the one. In English we have developed the tradition of using the name "God" in our translations as a general cover term, but that is a gratuitous accommodation to more familiar conventional naming practices, which results in the obscuring of the text. It is a tradition which is most assuredly not warranted by the way the Bible handles the problem of naming in this particular case. On the contrary, although the Bible is perfectly free and generous with all sorts of names of people and places and things, it goes to great lengths to avoid using any sort of name in this case. It introduces great complexity and confusion into the text, it indulges in elaborate plays on the problem of naming, and in at least one case explicitly alludes to the namelessness of what we conventionally call "God", all of which taken together amounts to an obvious positive avoidance, from which we can conclude that the Bible intends to convey the principle that the very first firstness must remain nameless.

To illustrate this theme I can mention a few examples. In the first place, the Bible never uses any proper noun as a name, such as "God", usually using attributive adjectives instead, such as "the mighty", "the nurturant", "the merciful", etc. And when Moses insisted that he must know His name, he was given a very strange name. It is not entirely clear how this name was pronounced to Moses, but it is written in the Hebrew text (here transliterated into English script) as "YHWH", which as given is unpronounceable. Of course, in Hebrew orthography practice at that time vowels were not marked at all, so it is possible that this name was pronounced to Moses, but it is written in the Hebrew text (here transliterated into English script) as "YHWH", which as given is unpronounceable. Of course, in Hebrew orthography practice at that time vowels were not marked at all, so it is possible that this name was intended to have vowels someplace, but this is a word which is unknown elsewhere, so whether it is supposed to have vowels, which vowels they are, and where they are supposed to go has been a matter of speculation for thousands of years. It has become the conventional opinion that it ought to be written "yahweh" and pronounced accordingly. On the other hand, it is also possible, and I find this possibility more satisfying, that Moses was given a name which is impossible to pronounce.
In either case, there developed a prescription against pronouncing this name among pious Jews, motivated by the command in Exodus 20:7. Thus whether unpronounceable de facto or unpronounced de jure, there was a hole in the system of Biblical language where we might have expected a name. And the point here is that this gap is predicted by and is consistent with the Law of Marks: the absolutely first is absolutely unmarked.

In addition to the pronunciation problem, the meaning of this name is also obscure, though once again there has arisen a conventionally accepted opinion that it means "I AM WHO I AM", which is at the least an unusual sort of name, being tautological. In normal English, if I asked someone his name and he gave this reply, I would interpret to mean "Don't ask!" Aside from the tautological problem, this interpretation of the name, if you can go so far as to call it a name, is undoubtedly related to the conviction of Christ for the blasphemy of taking the name of God when he said "I am". From which we might be able to conclude that the name of God really is "I am". Does this mean, as it seems to mean, that saying "I am" is a violation of the prohibition against taking the name of the Lord in vain? If so, then what can one say?

As a final example of the play on the practice of naming found in the Bible, look at the account in Acts 17:22-23, where Paul went to the Areopagus to speak to the philosophers of Athens. On the approach to the public arena he passed many images of gods which the Athenians included in their pantheon, each of which had a name that was well known to everyone. When faced with the problem of how to distinguish his God from their gods, he could have told them His name, but he chose instead to single out one particular altar on which was the inscription, "TO AN UNKNOWN GOD" and said

What therefore you worship in ignorance, this I proclaim to you.

and then proceeded to preach his message. Why did he resort to such round-about methods of reference, instead of simply naming the God whom he wanted to refer to? Because to give any name is to enter the referent into the same class as those other named images and hence to induce a symmetrical opposition, which would lead to a symmetrical competition on the same plane. In short, it would entail a false presupposition, which would place him in a position from which he could not get to where he wanted to be. As we will see in some examples later, you can get from the first to the second, but you cannot get from the second to the first. The first can only be presupposed; it cannot be asserted.

Nor, I might add, is this evasiveness about the name of this firstness limited to the Bible. There is a pervasive sensitivity to being named or to giving someone your own name. This particular instance of the absolutely namelessness of the absolutely first can be found in many different cultures. The principle is explicitly stated in the opening stanzas of the Tao Te Ching, to cite one example. (Lau, p. 57)

The way that can be spoken of
Is not the constant way;

The name that can be named
Is not the constant name.

The nameless was the beginning of heaven and earth;
The named was the mother of the myriad creatures.

It is crucial to realize that what is going on here is not merely a prescriptive taboo or some kind of repression, as a psychoanalytically sophisticated observer might be inclined to conclude. Nor is it the manifestation of some imagined intangible mysteriousness. It is the function of the real and natural forces which are at work in the Law of Marks.

The asymmetry in the use of the name can also be seen in personal interaction. In Bali, for example, according to Geertz (1973, p. 368-369):

All Balinese have personal names, but they rarely use them, either to refer to themselves or others or in addressing anyone. (With respect to one's forebears (sic), including one's parents, it is in fact sacrilegious to use them.) Children are more often referred to and on occasion even addressed by their personal names.

This kind of avoidance of the use of names, especially in addressing someone, is nearly universal. Note, in particular, that there is an asymmetry in that the use of the names of ascending relations is strictly forbidden, but the use of names for descending relations is not.

What is at stake here is the question of who names who. To name someone or something is to assert control over that thing. And to even know someone's name is a form of control. In English we have the saying, "I've got your number", which means that now I know you so I can get a grip on you and control you. Also, it is a fairly common occurrence for someone to call on the telephone and begin by saying, "Who is this?", and it is normal to refuse to give your name. Why? Because it is a violation of the normal and natural priority of control. Thus, this sensitivity to having names, giving names, and priority of names is a perfectly general characteristic of names as marks, and is predicted by the Law of Marks.

Allow me to point out that we have seen three formally unrelated systems of marking which are explained by the Law of Marks. First, we saw above that Greenberg demonstrated that the kin terms for "ascending generations are unmarked as against descending generations". Second, we saw that the text of the Bible is elaborately complicated in order to convey the principle that the absolutely first should be unnamed and we saw the same asserted in the Tao Te Ching. Third, we have seen that in Balinese usage, one is forbidden to use the name of one's prior relations, and similar sensitivities even in English. It would be impossible to grasp or explain the conceptual sameness of these formally diverse processes on the basis of form alone or in terms of symbolic logic. One must have a concept of firstness, radial opposition, and the Law of Marks.

These and other asymmetries of selective marking and avoidance of marking are not mere stylistic niceties, but are motivated by the deep-seated realization that to mark the first is incorrect and confusing. To mark the first in the same way as the second creates a representation which is incomprehensible, as can be seen very clearly in the morphological level of structure in language. If we consider a paradigm like the following,

True    Untrue
*   unfals  false
we can see the failure of the presumption of symmetry. One way of stating the problem here is that in terms of our geometric image of radial opposition it makes sense to say that the false is opposite to the true, but not that the true is opposite to the false. The circle is determined by reckoning from the center; The center is not determined by the circle. Adding marks cannot thus move toward the center; It can only move away from the center. Thus, "untrue" is comprehensible, because you can go from the true to the false by adding a mark. But, "unfalse" is incomprehensible because we want it to mean "true" but the root means false and the addition of the mark also means that it is false, but you can't get from the false to the true by means of the false. And there are many other paradigms which follow the same pattern.

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<th>clean</th>
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I would like to turn now to examine a few isolated examples of the application of the Law of Marks from various other aspects of language to demonstrate its ubiquity and flexibility. First, I would like to look at an abstract theoretical problem in word-level morphology. The basic formal opposition in morphology is between the root and affixes. It is clear in this opposition that the root is first and the affixes are second. This can be established in several ways. First, the root is usually defined as "that part of the word which represents the central meaning". Second, the root is usually capable of standing alone, but an affix can only occur when appended, thus depending on a root. Third, one root can support many affixes.

On independent grounds, as we saw above, we can establish that it is a fundamental principle in language, as well as in other dimensions of culture, that the chronologically prior is superior to the subsequent. From this principle governing the allocation of priority in time, we can conclude that it is most natural for the root of a word to come before the affix, which means that the suffix should be the preferred type of affix. There are, of course, prefixes in many languages, but the Law of Marks together with the principle of chronological priority predict that suffixes are more natural, thus, that prefixes are a marked type of affix. This prediction seems to be born out. Greenberg (1963, p. 93) says

*As between prefixing and suffixing, there is a general predominance of suffixing. Exclusively suffixing languages are fairly common, while exclusively prefixing languages are quite rare. In the present sample, only Thai seems to be exclusively prefixing.*
Moreover, in languages which have both prefixes and suffixes, the latter are, as in English, far more frequent.

It is convenient in terms of this example to clarify the distinction between chronological priority and conceptual priority. In the case of a suffixal construction, the root is first both in time and in conceptual priority, thus chronological and conceptual priority agree. In the case of a prefixal construction, the root is still first in conceptual priority, but it is second in chronological priority, thus conceptual priority is in disagreement with chronological priority. Therefore, chronological priority and conceptual priority are not the same phenomenon at all. It is predicted that the correlation of the two kinds of priority is unmarked, but not that they will always be in conformity.

In fact, what we are really taking about in this example should probably be analyzed as a question of the relation between syntagmatic and paradigmatic priority. In language, the order of elements is not strictly speaking a matter of time in the sense in which physics might use the word, because the entire construction is conceptualized at the same time and is mapped out in conceptual space as an entire unit chronologically prior to its pronunciation. Thus the relation between the first position and the second position in a form is a syntagmatic fact and the relation of priority between root and affix is a paradigmatic fact. So it has nothing directly to do with time. The corollary to the Law of Marks would be that the unmarked case is where syntagmatic priority correlates with paradigmatic priority.

This issue becomes especially critical when we come to consider markedness in tense/aspect systems. While it is notoriously difficult to align correlations from one language to another, it does seem to be the case that, as Greenberg opines,

*preterits seem to form a marked category in relation to the present. Thus in English the preterit has an overt marker -ed* ... (p 49)

And in those languages with imperfective/perfective systems, he is inclined to claim that the imperfective is first and unmarked. Jakobson has argued that the imperfective is the unmarked category also.

Notice that this ordering of conceptual priority contradicts the conventional idea of the relation of dominance between the past and the present. This is a conundrum which I do not want to get into here, but if it is recognized that the ability to apprehend the past is entirely a function of representation, it can be seen that the past resides in marks, and is therefore marked.

The same conclusion is reached by considering the alignment of the basic deictic markers. As we saw above, "now" is prior to "then".

Moving to a different topic again, if we consider the relation between subject and object, there are many considerations which suggest that the subject is first. The most important fact is that the subject of the sentence is normally presupposed, as opposed to the fact that the object is normally asserted. This difference, between what is presupposed and what is asserted is precisely what I have been claiming is characteristic of the position of first as opposed to second. And independent of my claims, it is obvious that what is presupposed must be prior to what is asserted.

There is another reason to suppose the subject is prior to the object. There are three classes of predicates according to whether they take one, two, or three arguments.
When there is only one argument, it is always the subject. When there are two or three arguments one of them is always the subject. Thus there can be no sentence without a subject (excluding ellipsis), but there can be a sentence without an object.

From the attribution of conceptual priority to the subject, it follows that the subject should be given syntagmatic priority. This prediction seems to be borne out too. Greenberg (1963, p 76) observes that if a normal declarative sentence consists of a subject, verb, and object,

Logically, there are six possible orders: SVO, SOV, VSO, VOS, OSV, and OVS. Of these six, however, only three normally occur as dominant orders. The three which do not occur at all, or at least are excessively rare, are VOS, OSV, and OVS. These all have in common that the object precedes the subject.

As a final general observation I would like to point out what is probably already clear, and that is that all of the examples I have given throughout the entire paper seem to suggest that language is built upon a system of presuppositions which consistently portray an underlying world, the presupposed original state of things, which can only be described as utopian world of truth, goodness, happiness, and beauty. And, the other half of the picture is that what is marked is false, bad, sad, ugly, etc. There is no a priori ground for doubting this alignment of qualities, but there is no question that it is in conflict with the prevailing view of the world as basically deceptive, unpleasant, grudging, and hostile, a place in which we must be wary, aggressive, and frugal, merely in order to survive.

For those who place themselves in that cast of mind which is described as "objective", the massive study of cross-cultural semantics by Charles E. Osgood provides statistically significant corroboration of the universality of this presupposed utopian world view. Using objective tests to gather mountains of numerical data and processing them with the most powerful computers to capture generalizations, Osgood (1975) has been obliged to propose what he calls the "Pollyanna hypothesis" to explain the fact that in his data "the bias toward the positive poles of factors was marked" (p 362). (An incorrect use of "marked" in the context of the present essay.) In particular,

(a) +E (positively evaluated) qualifiers are significantly more frequent in usage than their -E (negatively evaluated) opposites and (b) "positive" qualifiers are explicitly marked to form "negatives" (e.g. happy --- unhappy but not sad --- unsad) significantly more frequently than the reverse, implying priority of "positive" forms in language (p 363) (first two parentheses added)

Along the same lines, it is reported there that the distribution of the use of "but" or "and" in frames such as the following,

X is sweet _____ brave

X is sweet _____ cowardly

can be predicted with high accuracy not only from congruence in polarity of the adjective pairs when dominant on the same factors but also from their congruence in polarity across different affective factors... i.e., there appears to be a general "positiveness (yang) vs. "negativeness" (yin) operating here.(Osgood 1975, p. 363)
That is, one would say "sweet and brave", showing that the two terms are considered to be the same in some sense, even though they are not obviously related in any way semantically. The relationship is that both are first. In contrast, one would say "sweet but cowardly", because one is a first and the other is a second.

I must confess that I find it impossible to evaluate the overall validity of this objective study. It is hard to judge the consequences of the predetermined framework of the tests themselves, it is hard to judge the consequences of the artificial transaction of testing, it is hard to judge the consequences of translation into many languages, and it is hard to judge what exactly is being captured by the intricate statistical nets which they drag through the data. They observe that "we can never really know how many little fish have slipped through our nets" (p. 410), but I am not in a position to judge whether they are catching fish at all, or merely sea weed.

But, the "Pollyanna Hypothesis" is only one of many results of these massive studies and one which they were surprised to find. In this case it seems that they do objectively corroborate the general tendency which I have been trying to show is the underlying topography of the landscape upon which language is constructed and to which in general it conforms.

One thing however that is clear is that when they attempt to explain the Pollyanna hypothesis their reasoning is quite obviously too narrow and incorrectly biased because they begin reasoning from the wrong point of view. The entire enterprise is developed within the frame of reference of the logic of thirdness. They begin their reasoning by imagining a hypothetical semantic space consisting of an indefinite number of symmetrical dimensions. (p. 38-39) This space is organized, "like all respectable mathematical spaces", around a point of origin, which is assumed to be complete meaninglessness, implying that the reference point of language is meaninglessness. To establish the dimensions of this space "we conceive of verbal opposites as straight lines through the origin of the semantic space". The authority and logical presupposition underlying this image is given thus.

"Lexicographers assure us that true verbal opposites do cancel each other semantically, component for component, when "mixed".

I do not know who these lexicographers might be, but this statement does not make any sense to me. A little later they say the same thing in other words.

"combination of an adjective with its opposite typically has the effect of canceling the imports of the terms taken separately, just as the additive mixture of complementary hues yields neutral grey. (p.39)

They mention the opposites beautiful/ugly and soft/hard in this discussion, but they do not give examples of what they are describing, though it is apparently sentences like this.

The soft pudding was hard.
The soft and hard pudding was delicious.

I do not detect any neutralization here. Only incomprehensibility. It seems that laboring under the desire to create what they call a "respectable mathematical space" on the basis of a false analogy between the properties of paint and the properties of language, they come up with this multidimensional space which satisfies their preconceived desire to
reason within dimensions that have a "neutral" center. They then assume further that each dimension is independent of each other. And after all of this assuming of symmetry and independence, they set out to try to find out if there is

some "natural" organizing principle of this space analogous to the gravitational and magnetic determinants of geophysical space

As I see it, what they have done is to assume the conceptual image of space given by the logic of threeness, with its neutral center and symmetrical opposites, and thereby precluded the possibility of arriving at a coherent representation of the gravitational center they are looking for, which is given naturally by the logic of secondness.

That this is the case can be seen in their attempt to explain the Pollyanna phenomena which they do manage to perceive, though in a glass darkly.

Let us assume that there is a rather strong tendency toward conformity with what is conceived as socially desirable and avoidance of giving negative ratings when in doubt (i.e., the Pollyanna tendency). This should result in a general "push" away from the neutral region toward positive directions. (p. 363)

Notice that this dynamic implies that the unmarked position, the default beginning point is neutrality, and that structure deviates from this central point symmetrically in all directions. Of course, as we have seen this is just what you do not find in natural language, but rather in systems of mathematical and symbolic logic.

In another place they say that it is "due to the social psychological pressure to 'say nice things'" and cite as apparent corroboration studies by DiVesta which show that "the evaluatively positive members of pairs typically appear earlier in age level and maintain a higher frequency-diversity of usage than their evaluatively negative opposite numbers." (p 208)

It is difficult to specify all of the ways in which this supposed explanation has got the cart before the horse. When they posit "what is conceived as socially desirable" as being the goal toward which their subjects strive, they are begging the question, which is why do they all, in many different cultures, conceive of the same things as socially desirable? And even before that, one would like to know if these objective studies have objectively and independently defined the classes which they refer to as "positive" and "negative" as classifications of qualifiers, or did they just take it from ordinary English? I suspect that the fact that they felt obliged to put these words in quotation marks as seen in the above quote is intended to mean that these are not operationally defined concepts in their theory.

Aside from these internal problems, their entire method of analysis and their mode explanation cannot possibly apprehend any but the most superficial of the correlated facts which I have described above. Their method is only capable of grasping the superficial relation between pairs of adjectives, such as happy/sad, beautiful/ugly, etc. Their original symmetrical hypothetical space precludes in principle the entry of lexical facts where a form is opposed to no form at all. And, of course their explanation cannot account for any of the facts of morphological markedness. And, it cannot comprehend syntagmatic phenomena. How can they explain the preference for suffixes over prefixes? Is this somehow a matter of social psychological pressure to say nice things? How can these properties be conceived as socially undesirable, in the intended sense of not being nice?
The final issue which becomes evident here is whether these are social facts at all. Are the kind of facts I have been talking about here a function of social processes? Is the fabric of markedness a conventional phenomenon? If so, then how would it be possible to explain its uniformity across societies, languages, and cultures? If not, then what kind of facts are they? Where do they fit into the scheme of things?

In trying to assess the implications of this phenomenon, one encounters several fundamental oppositions. First, we have the opposition between phenomena that are natural and those that are cultural, including language. It is clear that what is natural is first, thus culture is unnatural. On the basis of this opposition, we would be led to claim that the universal, cross-cultural basis of markedness must be natural.

However, there is also the opposition between mind and body, between the mental and the physical. In this opposition, it is a nearly universally held premise that the physical is first. If so, then what is natural must belong to the physical, and what is cultural must belong to the mental. It is on the basis of this alignment of firstness between these two oppositions, that almost all scholars begin to think about this question with the presumption that what is natural, as opposed to merely cultural, must be biological, as opposed to mental. By this line of reasoning, it would follow that if we do not want to say that these facts are conventional cultural facts, then we must say that they are biological facts. Of course, it makes no sense at all to say that the relation between one/many, true/false, good/evil, etc. are biological facts. They manifestly are not. Nor are they conventional cultural facts. Where does that leave us then? This is precisely the conclusion at which most people who have traveled this path arrive. And yet this is not a satisfactory resolution of the problem, because facts such as those I have adduced here, and many many more besides, cannot be made to go away by ignoring them. And moreover, the consequence of trying to avoid them is that one must also avoid penetrating into the deep and vital heart of language and the vitality of human being. One is confined to scratching around on the surface among the dead and dried skeletons of mere form.
6. BIBLIOGRAPHY


